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ERRONEOUS INJUNCTIONS
Michael T. Morley

ABSTRACT
When a federal court concludes that a statute or regulation is
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, it will often enter an injunction
prohibiting the government from enforcing that measure against the plaintiff in
that case. But a court will dissolve a preliminary injunction after trial when it
concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief on the merits. It may likewise
vacate a permanent injunction when subsequent developments in precedent
reveal that it misconstrued the relevant legal provisions. And any type of
injunction may be overturned on appeal.
Once an erroneously issued injunction has been reversed, vacated, or
dissolved, the government may enforce the challenged legal provision against
the plaintiff if it violates that provision in the future. It is less clear, however,
whether the government may similarly prosecute that plaintiff or impose other
punitive measures against it for violating the challenged provision while the
injunction was in effect. Despite the centrality of injunctive relief in
constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court expressly left this issue unresolved
in Edgar v. MITE Corp., with various opinions defending different sides of the
issue. Recent scholarship has vigorously advocated such retroactive
prosecutions. The Supreme Court has exacerbated the confusion by construing
many of the most seemingly applicable defenses—due process “fair notice”
restrictions, prohibitions against ex post facto laws, and the mistake of law
defense—too narrowly to completely bar retroactive punitive enforcement of
previously enjoined legal provisions.
This Article offers a new approach. Drawing on traditional equitable
practices, including the principles governing injunction bonds as well as
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criminal contempt proceedings under injunctions that have been overturned,
this Article demonstrates that even injunctions that were issued erroneously and
no longer remain in force can continue to affect litigants’ rights. It further
explains that federal courts have authority—as a component of both the Article
III judicial power as well as their equitable powers—to prevent the federal
government and states from taking punitive measures against people for actions
performed under the protection of a federal injunction. This Article goes on to
examine various ways in which courts may implement this restriction.
Injunctions are critical tools for protecting constitutional rights. Courts may
shield litigants from the possibility of civil penalties, statutory damages, and
criminal prosecution for acts taken under injunctions that were issued
erroneously.
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INTRODUCTION
When a court concludes that a law, regulation, executive order, or other legal
provision is unconstitutional, it will decline to apply or enforce that provision in
the case before it.1 Courts generally treat unconstitutional legal provisions as
void,2 at least in most respects.3 Additionally, in civil cases,4 the court will often
enter an injunction prohibiting the defendants—who are usually governmental
officials or entities (though not always5)—from enforcing that provision.6
But what happens if the court makes a mistake or later changes its mind?
This can happen in a variety of ways. For example, an appellate court may
1
See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (describing the power of judicial review as
“the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment”).
2
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (“An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.”); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879) (“An
unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.”).
3
See generally OLIVER P. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE (1935) (discussing
various legal consequences of unconstitutional laws in certain contexts).
4
“There is no mechanism for seeking an injunction, however, based on constitutional, interpretive, or
other such issues raised in the context of a criminal case.” Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral:
Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2496 (2014).
5
See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding § 27A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1, unconstitutional in litigation by private investors against a securities
investment company); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (holding § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1471, unconstitutional in bankruptcy
litigation between an entity seeking reorganization and a private company that was allegedly liable to it for
breach of contract and various torts); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1(a) (requiring a litigant challenging the
constitutionality of a federal or state law to serve notice on the U.S. Attorney General or state attorney general,
respectively, if no agencies or officials of the appropriate government are parties to the suit).
6
F. Andrew Hessick & Michael T. Morley, Interpreting Injunctions, 107 VA. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (2021)
(“An injunction is . . . a judicial order commanding a person to take, or refrain from taking, a particular action.”).
The U.S. Supreme Court has specified the requirements for preliminary injunctions, Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008), and permanent injunctions, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 391 (2006). See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2012) (arguing that eBay’s
four-factor test does not accurately reflect traditional equitable principles, which rested instead on presumptions
and safety valves).
In recent years, commentators have strenuously disagreed on the proper scope of relief in constitutional
cases. Some have argued in favor of statewide, and even nationwide, defendant-oriented injunctions. See, e.g.,
Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018). Such orders
completely prohibit a government defendant from enforcing the underlying legal provision against anyone,
anywhere in the state or nation. See Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and DefendantOriented Injunction in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 487, 490 (2016). Others have raised a variety of objections to such orders, arguing that a court generally
must instead issue plaintiff-oriented injunctions, tailored to protecting the rights of the plaintiff or plaintiffs
before it. See Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2019)
[hereinafter Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions]; Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 (2017).
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overturn a preliminary injunction7 in an interlocutory appeal8 or a permanent
injunction after final judgment.9 A district court may decide to modify or revoke
a preliminary injunction while a case remains pending10 or dissolve it at the end
of the case by declining to enter a permanent injunction.11 And a court may even
vacate a permanent injunction long after a case has concluded12 when the
constitutional or statutory provisions involved are reinterpreted in subsequent
cases.13 This Article will refer to all of these types of orders collectively as
“erroneous injunctions.”14
An injunction, judgment, or judicial opinion holding a legal provision
unconstitutional neither nullifies that provision nor removes it from the law
books. And once that judicial impediment is overturned, vacated, or otherwise
dissolved, the government may resume enforcing the provision prospectively
against future illegal conduct.15 For example, in 1923, Adkins v. Children’s
7
See, e.g., N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 311 (4th Cir. 2020); Courthouse
News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1075 (7th Cir. 2018). For brevity, this Article will use the term
“preliminary injunction” to refer to both preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, except where
it is necessary to distinguish between them.
8
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (authorizing interlocutory appeals of district court orders “granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions”).
9
See, e.g., Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665, 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2020); Trustees of Ind. Univ. v. Curry, 918
F.3d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 2019); Ronnie Van Zant, Inc. v. Cleopatra Recs., Inc., 906 F.3d 253, 258–59 (2d Cir.
2018).
10
See, e.g., I.M. Wilson, Inc. v. Grichko, No. 18-5194, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182350, at *13 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 18, 2019).
11
See, e.g., Garnett v. Zeilinger, 485 F. Supp. 3d 206, 232–33 (D.D.C. 2020).
12
See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (authorizing district courts to grant relief from a final judgment when
“applying it prospectively is no longer equitable”).
13
See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237–40 (1997) (vacating a permanent injunction given the
change in Establishment Clause caselaw); Assoc. Builders & Contractors v. Mich. Dep’t of Lab. & Econ.
Growth, 543 F.3d 275, 278–79 (6th Cir. 2008) (revisiting an injunction after a change in ERISA caselaw).
14
Likewise, when this Article discusses injunctions being “reversed” or “overturned,” it should be
understood as including all of these forms of subsequent rejection by courts, except when context dictates
otherwise.
15
See, e.g., Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C. 1952) (holding that if a judicial ruling that rendered
a law “inoperative or unenforceable” is reversed, then the “statute is valid from its first effective date”); Pierce
v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86, 95 (1874) (“[T]he cases having been overruled, the statutes must be regarded as having all
the time been the law of the State.”); Earl T. Crawford, The Legislative Status of an Unconstitutional Statute, 49
MICH. L. REV. 645, 651 (1951); Note, The Effect of Declaring a Statute Unconstitutional, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
1140, 1146–47 (1929); see also Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553–54 (1870) (holding that the
Legal Tender Act of 1862, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345, 352 (Feb. 25, 1862), was constitutional and enforceable, and
reversing Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1868), which had held the law unconstitutional); William
Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of “Unconstitutional” Statutes,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1908–17 (1993) (collecting cases); cf. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 564–65 (1891)
(holding that, where a state enacts a law that may not validly be applied to interstate commerce without
congressional consent and Congress subsequently passes a law authorizing such provisions, the state law may
be applied to transactions that occurred in the interim between the enactment of the two measures).
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Hospital held that Washington, D.C.’s minimum wage law was
unconstitutional.16 Over a decade later, the Court overruled Adkins in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, declaring that minimum wage laws are valid.17 The U.S.
Attorney General issued a legal opinion to President Roosevelt concluding that
Washington D.C.’s minimum wage law was accordingly “valid from the date it
became effective.”18 Relying on that opinion, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled
that the law was enforceable without any need for Congress to re-enact or
otherwise resuscitate it.19
It is far less clear, however, whether a person is subject to liability, civil
penalties, or even criminal prosecution for violating a legal provision while an
injunction barred the government from enforcing it. At first blush, basic norms
of fundamental fairness suggest that a person cannot be punished for actions
taken under the protection of an injunction. The purpose of a pre-enforcement
injunction, like a declaratory judgment, is to allow a litigant to safely navigate
“between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state [or federal] law and the
Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected
activity.”20
But reality may be more complicated. In general, “a rule of federal law, once
announced and applied to the parties to the controversy, must be given full
retroactive effect by all courts adjudicating federal law.”21 And in Edgar v. MITE
Corp., various Supreme Court Justices reached sharply different conclusions
about whether a plaintiff who won a preliminary injunction against a state law,
and then violated that law while the injunction was in effect, could be prosecuted
for those actions if the injunction were later reversed on appeal.22 The plurality
acknowledged that this was a difficult question without resolving it.23 And
16

261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923).
300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
18
39 Op. Att’y Gen. 22, 22–23 (1937); see also Treanor & Sperling, supra note 15, at 1913–14; Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 64
n.93 (1993); Erica Frohman P lave, Note, The Phenomenon of Antique Laws: Can a State Revive Old Abortion
Laws in a New Era?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 120 (1989).
19
Jawish, 86 A.2d at 97.
20
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
21
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 96 (1993).
22
Compare 457 U.S. 624, 648–49 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“Neither the terms of the preliminary injunction nor prior equity practice provides any support for an
interpretation of the District Court’s order as a grant of total immunity from future prosecution.”), with id. at 656
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding that a federal court has “the power to issue a preliminary injunction that
offers permanent protection from penalties for violations of the statute that occurred during the period the
injunction was in effect,” even if the injunction is later overturned).
23
See id. at 630 n.5 (plurality opinion) (holding that a nonfrivolous dispute existed over whether a litigant
was subject to civil or criminal penalties under such circumstances); see also id. at 665 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
17
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subsequent courts have grappled with the problem,24 with several allowing
defendants to be prosecuted for actions taken under the protection of injunctions
that were later overturned.25
The academic literature on equity is likewise sharply divided. Professor
Jonathan Mitchell’s recent Virginia Law Review article, The Writ-of-Erasure
Fallacy, contends that when a court reverses, vacates, or dissolves an injunction
against a legal provision, “the executive [is] free to enforce the [provision]
again—both against those who will violate it in the future and against those who
have violated it in the past.”26 Professor Douglas Laycock also recognized this
possibility while touching upon a few potential counterarguments and noting
that the “issue remains unresolved.”27
Professor Richard Fallon, in contrast, advocates a more selective approach,
taking into account the type of remedy the government seeks to impose for acts
taken while an erroneous injunction was in effect.28 He contends that due process
concerns about adequate notice prevent the government from retroactively
prosecuting someone for violating a statute while its enforcement had been
enjoined.29 The government may, however, be able to impose civil penalties or
similar sanctions for such conduct.30 Other scholars have recognized the
problem without reaching a solution.31 Academic works on the revival of
(recognizing the “possibility” that the plaintiff might be subject to an enforcement action for violating an Illinois
statute after obtaining a preliminary injunction against that law if the injunction were later overturned on appeal,
but declining to resolve the issue).
24
See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
25
See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
26
Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 987 (2018).
27
Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977
SUP. CT. REV. 193, 209 (1977) (“If the final judgment holds the statute valid, dissolves the interlocutory
injunction, and denies permanent relief, state officials would be free to prosecute any violation within the
limitations period. . . . While the case for protecting litigants who relied in good faith on the interlocutory order
of a federal court is strong, so is the argument that there is no federal power to enjoin enforcement of a
constitutional state statute.”).
28
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 619 (2007).
29
Id.; see also Patrick T. Gillen, Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Governmental Defendants:
Trustworthy Shield or Sword of Damocles?, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 269, 315 (2016) (arguing that due process
prevents the government from prosecuting a person for crimes they committed while under the protection of a
preliminary injunction); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 883 n.191
(1991).
30
Fallon, supra note 28, at 619.
31
See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, How Much Protection Do Injunctions Against Enforcement of Allegedly
Unconstitutional Statutes Provide?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 668–70 (2004) (concluding that Congress could
enact a statute immunizing conduct performed in violation of an enjoined federal or state law but recognizing
that it has failed to do so, and expressing uncertainty over whether the Due Process Clause bars such prosecutions
(citing Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003)); cf. Doug Rendleman, Preserving the Nationwide
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previously invalidated statutory provisions32 and the retroactive application of
judicial reinterpretations of the law more generally33 have likewise touched on
this issue.
The abortion statute that Texas enacted in 2021, S.B.8, purports to impose
substantial civil liability based on conduct performed pursuant to court rulings
that are later overturned.34 The statute creates a private right of action allowing
any person to sue someone who either performs an abortion or aids and abets a
pregnant woman in obtaining an abortion when a fetal heartbeat is detectable, in
the absence of a medical emergency.35 A successful plaintiff may recover
National Government Injunction to Stop Illegal Executive Branch Activity, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 919–21
(2020) (discussing the distinction between “erroneous” and “void” injunctions).
32
See, e.g., FIELD, supra note 3, at 181–87, 195–97 (collecting cases and recommending the enactment
of statutes to protect people who act in reliance on judicial decisions); Treanor & Sperling, supra note 15, at
1906–08 (arguing that, when a court overturns a precedent under which laws had been held unconstitutional,
those laws should not “be revived” if they “implicate[] individual liberty interests” in order to “force current
legislative reconsideration” of the issue, particularly since the court’s earlier ruling may have blunted efforts to
repeal such measures); Mark C. Graham, Note, State v. Douglas: Judicial “Revival” of an Unconstitutional
Statute, 34 LA. L. REV. 851, 855 (1974) (concluding that, if a court changes its interpretation of the Constitution
or a statute after holding the statute unconstitutional, “then the statute can be enforced in the future without
reenactment; it was not previously ‘invalidated,’ but simply not enforced because it was erroneously believed
that the constitution prevented enforcement”); Crawford, supra note 15, at 648; Note, The Effect of the
Unconstitutionality of a Statute, 37 GEO. L.J. 574, 591 (1949); The Effect of Declaring a Statute
Unconstitutional, supra note 15, at 1146 (“There would appear to be no practical reason why the statute should
not be applied after the reason for the prior refusal to apply it has been removed . . . .”).
33
Some commentators have argued that the Court is too willing to retroactively apply new judicial
interpretations of legal provisions, especially in criminal cases. See Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the
Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 492 (2001) (arguing that
defendants should be able to assert a due process defense when their conduct was consistent with circuit-level
precedent, rather than only Supreme Court precedent). Others have vigorously defended retroactively applying
judicial changes in the law. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial
Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 836–37 (2003) (arguing that judicial opinions should be fully
retroactively applicable); Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the
Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35, 93–94 (1997) (arguing that “checks on retroactive
lawmaking are not as critical” for courts since judges are less likely than legislatures to act vindictively toward
criminals); see also Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive
Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2145 (1996) [hereinafter Krent, Puzzling Boundary] (arguing there is a greater
need for judicial protection against retroactive criminal laws than against civil statutes because the political
process already provides substantial protection against the latter). Important work also exists on the converse
issue of the extent to which rightsholders are entitled to remedies for violations of constitutional rights that the
Supreme Court does not recognize until after those violations have occurred. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel
J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991).
These questions are a subset of broader issues concerning mens rea and mistake of law as defenses. See
John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 42, 78 (1997)
(“Instead of treating the reliance defense solely as a matter of due process, courts should begin again to assess
claims of reliance on official advice under common law principles of moral culpability.”); Rollin M. Perkins,
Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 43 (1939).
34
See S. 8, 87th Legis. Assemb. (Tex. 2021) (codified at TEX. CODE § 171.201).
35
Id. (codified at Tex. Code §§ 171.204(a), 171.205).
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damages of at least $10,000 for each abortion performed in violation of the act.36
The statute expressly provides that it is “not a defense” that a defendant “reli[ed]
on any court decision that has been overruled on appeal or by a subsequent court,
even if that court decision had not been overruled when the defendant engaged
in conduct that violates this subchapter.”37 This provision appears to allow a
person to be held liable for violating S.B.8 for acts performed while enforcement
of S.B.8 was enjoined, if that injunction is later reversed, vacated, or dissolved.
This law presumes that retroactive application of essentially punitive
remedies—here, a substantial statutory fine—for conduct taken under the
protection of a since-vacated injunction is permissible.
This Article offers a new approach. It demonstrates that, under traditional
equitable principles, erroneous injunctions that are no longer in effect can
continue to influence litigants’ rights. For example, when a plaintiff commits
acts that amount to a tort or statutory violation while under an injunction’s
protection, and that order is later reversed, vacated, or dissolved, the aggrieved
rightsholder (i.e., the previously enjoined defendant) may not pursue its
otherwise available tort or statutory claims against the plaintiff. Rather, that
rightsholder is relegated to an action on the injunction bond, if any, that the court
ordered when entering the injunction.38 In other words, even an erroneous
injunction that is no longer in effect permanently limits the manner and extent
to which a wrongfully enjoined party may retroactively enforce its rights against
the plaintiff for the plaintiff’s actions while the injunction was in force. The
injunction’s reversal does not restore the full range of legal rights that the
wrongfully enjoined party would have possessed had the injunction never been
issued.
Likewise, if an enjoined party willfully violates an injunction that is
subsequently reversed or vacated, then the issuing court may hold that party in
criminal contempt for those past actions, even though the underlying order is no
longer in effect. Such retroactive enforcement of an invalid order is said to
vindicate the authority of the issuing court and encourage litigants to seek
judicial review of apparently invalid orders rather than unilaterally deciding for

36

Id. (codified at Tex. Code § 171.208(b)(2)).
Id. (codified at Tex. Code § 171.208(e)(3)).
38
An injunction bond indemnifies the enjoined party “in damages if the injunction was ‘wrongfully’ sued
out.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 305 (1964). In many circuits, courts generally have discretion over the
amount of the bond and whether to allow an erroneously enjoined defendant to recover on it. See infra notes
217–18, 231–33 and accompanying text.
37
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themselves to violate them.39 Thus, erroneous injunctions may continue to exert
important legal effects even after their reversal.
Having laid that foundation, this Article goes on to show that the Article III
judicial power40 and federal courts’ constitutional authority to grant equitable
relief41 allow federal courts to issue injunctions that definitively establish
litigants’ rights concerning acts taken while those orders are in effect, even
though the injunctions are subject to appeal or the possibility of later being
vacated or otherwise overturned. At most, a person should be required to pay
compensatory damages or restitution for acts taken pursuant to an erroneous
injunction that is later reversed. Remedies with a punitive element—including
civil fines, civil penalties, substantial presumed statutory damages, punitive
damages, licensure revocations, and criminal prosecutions—should be
unavailable.
Although this authority arises from Article III and federal courts’ equitable
powers, this Article recommends two ways of facilitating its implementation.
First, courts should expressly prohibit retroactive punitive proceedings for acts
taken pursuant to subsequently overturned injunctions. During the early
twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court occasionally issued injunctions that
expressly specified that the government defendant was prohibited from ever
pursuing an enforcement action against the plaintiff—including an enforcement
action commenced after the injunction was reversed, vacated, or dissolved—for
violating the enjoined legal provisions while the injunction remained in effect.42
Second, rather than including such language in each injunction, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(d)43 could be amended to specify that injunctions enjoining
enforcement of legal provisions shall presumptively be interpreted as implicitly
containing such restrictions.
Part I of this Article begins by delving into the dispute among the Justices in
Edgar v. MITE Corp.44 over the extent of a person’s civil and criminal liability
for violating legal provisions that were enjoined under erroneous injunctions that
are later reversed. This Part then turns to the argument, recently presented by
Professor Jonathan Mitchell, that such an overturned injunction provides no
protection against later prosecutions or other enforcement proceedings for

39
40
41
42
43
44

See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See infra notes 361–71 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d).
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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conduct performed while the order had been in effect.45 This Part goes on to
discuss how this “writ of erasure” argument would greatly undermine the utility
of injunctions in public law cases. It concludes by examining why some of the
most obvious potential defenses, such as due process and mistake of law
theories, are too narrow to fully alleviate the problem.
Part II explains how the traditional equitable principles governing injunction
bonds demonstrate that overturned injunctions can exert ongoing legal effects.46
This Part shows that an erroneous injunction can continue to limit a wrongfully
enjoined party’s ability to seek complete relief even after that order is reversed,
vacated, or otherwise dissolved. The government should not be able to claim
greater authority to take retroactive punitive measures in public law cases.
Part III bolsters this analysis with another example of the continuing legal
effects of overturned erroneous injunctions. It shows that if an enjoined party
violates an injunction that is later deemed erroneous and reversed, then that
wrongly enjoined party may nevertheless subsequently be held in criminal
contempt. When considering the legality of the enjoined party’s actions, the
relevant law is typically based on the injunction as it existed at the time of those
actions, regardless of whether the injunction is subsequently overturned. The
same should be true in assessing the legality of the plaintiff’s actions (i.e., the
45

Mitchell, supra note 26, at 986–1003.
A few pieces, mostly dated, have focused on injunction bonds. See Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of
Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1414–17 (2015) (explaining the role
of judicial discretion in imposing injunction bonds); Elizabeth Leight Quick, Note, The Triggering of Liability
on Injunction Bonds, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1252, 1277 (1974) (providing a descriptive overview of injunction bonds
and concluding that a defendant may recover on a bond for a preliminary injunction if the court declines to enter
a permanent injunction); Dan B. Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional
Injunctive Relief?, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1974) (suggesting comprehensive changes to the law governing
injunction bonds); Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. REV. 333, 347–53
(1959) (discussing alternatives to recovery on injunction bonds and Erie issues concerning Rule 65(c)); see also
Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Remedies for Wrongfully-Issued Preliminary Injunctions: The Case for
Disgorgement of Profits, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 903, 905 (2009) (arguing that wrongfully enjoined defendants
should be entitled to seek restitution as an alternative to suing on the bond).
Several pieces have argued that injunction bond requirements should be waived in public interest cases.
See Erin Connors Morton, Note, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c): Exceptions to the Rule
Gone Awry, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1863, 1904 (1995) (“In noncommercial cases, such as those involving the
vindication of constitutional rights or public benefits rights under a federal statute, waiver may be appropriate.”);
Note, Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99 HARV. L. REV. 828, 835 (1986)
(arguing that courts should be required to set bond in an amount “sufficient to compensate fully an injured
defendant,” except in cases “involving indigent or public interest plaintiffs”); Reina Calderon, Bond
Requirements Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c): An Emerging Equitable Exemption for Public
Interest Litigants, 13 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 125, 167 (1985) (arguing that bonds “can and should be waived
by courts in the public interest litigation setting”); Alexander T. Henson & Kenneth F. Gray, Injunction Bonding
in Environmental Litigation, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 541, 552 (1979) (“[T]he bond requirement is unjustified
as a tool of deterrence and presents a serious obstacle to environmental litigation.”).
46
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party that obtained the injunction). Thus, a key premise of the writ of erasure
argument appears inconsistent with traditional equitable principles; even
erroneous and subsequently overturned injunctions can continue to govern
litigants’ rights for the period those orders had been in effect.
Building on these insights, Part IV sets forth this Article’s main normative
contributions. It demonstrates that the Article III judicial power (for permanent
injunctions) and the federal judiciary’s equitable powers (for both preliminary
and permanent injunctions) enable federal courts to bar a government defendant
from using punitive measures to retroactively enforce a legal provision for acts
performed while that provision had been enjoined, even after the injunction is
overturned or otherwise dissolved. This Part then examines the various ways in
which courts may implement this critical restriction. It suggests that courts
should include express language to this effect in each order they issue.
Alternatively, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee should recommend
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) to modify the default rules
that govern the interpretation of injunctions. The final Part briefly concludes.
Injunctions play a critical role in the enforcement of both constitutional
rights47 and statutory constraints on the modern administrative state.48 The Court
should adopt a clear, consistent understanding of an injunction’s effects when it
proves to be erroneous.
I.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOLLOWING ERRONEOUS INJUNCTIONS

Much of the uncertainty concerning the potential civil and criminal liability
of people who commit otherwise illegal acts under the protection of erroneous
injunctions that are later overturned stems from the opinions of various Supreme
Court Justices in Edgar v. MITE Corp.49 Building on this uncertainty, Professor
47
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (holding that federal courts “issue injunctions to protect
rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the 14th
Amendment forbids the State to do” (footnotes omitted)); OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4
(1978); Morley, supra note 4, at 2457 (“[I]njunctions provide stronger protection for a person’s constitutional
or statutory rights than any other remedy currently available from federal courts.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 416–17
(2000) (arguing that injunctions present “the best hope for preventing constitutional violations where a majority
is willing to bear the costs of paying compensation or where a powerful interest group benefits from the
unconstitutional activity”).
48
See Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967) (allowing a pre-enforcement suit for injunctive
and declaratory relief against pharmaceutical labeling regulations to proceed because requiring the plaintiffs to
“challenge these regulations only as a defense to an action brought by the Government might harm them severely
and unnecessarily”), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
49
457 U.S. 624.
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Jonathan Mitchell articulated a new, parsimonious view of the federal
judiciary’s equity power in The Writ of Erasure Fallacy.50 In his view,
injunctions barring enforcement of federal or state legal provisions lack any
permanent immunizing effect.51 At most, such an order only delays prosecution
or civil enforcement actions against a litigant who violates the enjoined legal
provisions, until such time as the order is reversed.52 Many of the most common
objections to retroactive application of newly enacted laws or new judicial
interpretations of legal provisions cannot completely overcome this “writ of
erasure” analysis.
A. Edgar v. MITE Corp.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Court considered for the first time whether an
entity that violated a state law while enforcement of that law was enjoined could
be prosecuted once the injunction was lifted.53 The Illinois Business Take-Over
Act required all tender offers for shares of Illinois corporations to be filed with
the Illinois Secretary of State twenty days before the offers were made to
shareholders or publicized.54 During that twenty-day waiting period, the
Secretary could hold a hearing on the offer.55 Even if the Secretary decided
against holding such a hearing, either the target company’s outside directors or
a group of its Illinois shareholders could require the Secretary to do so.56 Once
a hearing was held, the Secretary could register the offer to allow it to proceed
only if he determined that it disclosed all relevant information and the price was
not “inequitable.”57 There was no deadline by which the Secretary had to make
these determinations.58
The plaintiff, MITE Corp., was a Delaware corporation that made a tender
offer for an Illinois corporation, Chicago Rivet & Machine Co.59 MITE
registered its tender offer with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), as required by the federal Williams Act.60 It did not comply with the
Illinois law, however, which would have triggered the twenty-day waiting

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

See Mitchell, supra note 26.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 987–1000.
457 U.S. 624.
Id. at 626–27 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, ¶ 137.54.A (1979)).
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, ¶ 137.57.E).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 627 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f)).
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period and given the Secretary an opportunity to reject the offer.61 Rather, MITE
sued in federal court, arguing that the Illinois law was preempted by the
Williams Act and unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.62
The district court entered “a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary
. . . from enforcing the Illinois [law] against MITE” in connection with its
“tender offer for Chicago Rivet.”63 While the preliminary injunction was in
effect, MITE published its tender offer in the Wall Street Journal.64 A few days
later, the court followed up with a permanent injunction, concluding that the
Illinois law was both preempted and unconstitutional.65 After the court entered
final judgment, MITE and Chicago Rivet entered into an agreement that resulted
in MITE withdrawing its tender offer.66 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling,67 and the Secretary sought
review in the U.S. Supreme Court.68
The Court began by considering whether the case was moot since MITE was
no longer making a tender offer in violation of state law.69 The Secretary had
declared that if the district court’s injunction were reversed, then he would
pursue civil penalties and potentially even criminal prosecution against MITE
for initiating its tender offer in violation of the Illinois law.70 The Court
acknowledged that a nonfrivolous dispute existed over whether “the preliminary
injunction issued by the District Court is a complete defense to civil or criminal
penalties.”71 It declined to address that question, however. Instead, the Court
declared that if it reversed the injunction, then the question would be “decided
when and if the Secretary of State initiates an action.”72 Thus, because MITE
faced the possibility of civil and criminal liability under Illinois law for its past
actions if the permanent injunction were overturned, the Secretary’s appeal was
not moot.73 The Court went on to affirm the lower courts’ rulings that the Illinois

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 628.
Id.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 629–30.
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 502–03 (7th Cir. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Edgar, 457 U.S. 624.
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 630.
Id.
Id. at 630 & n.5.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.

MORLEY_6.15.22

1150

5/8/2022 8:50 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1137

law was unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause.74 A plurality
also concluded that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois law.75
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion declared that, to determine whether the
appeal was moot, the Court should have resolved whether the preliminary
injunction in effect when MITE published its tender offer in the Wall Street
Journal gave the company a complete defense to any enforcement actions, even
if the Court determined the order was erroneous.76 Stevens argued that the case
remained a live, justiciable controversy because MITE would face civil and
criminal liability if the Court concluded that the Illinois law was valid and should
not have been enjoined.77 He declared, “Neither the terms of the preliminary
injunction nor prior equity practice provides any support for an interpretation of
the District Court’s order as a grant of total immunity from future prosecution.”78
Justice Stevens added that federal courts lack the “power to grant such
blanket dispensation from the requirements of valid legislative enactments.”79
The fact that plaintiffs must typically post bond as a condition of obtaining a
preliminary injunction,80 he argued, confirms that an injunction does not
inherently immunize such plaintiffs from all legal liability if it is later overturned
or vacated.81 He further emphasized that litigants are aware that lower courts’
injunctions—and even judgments—can be overturned on appeal.82 Thus, when
a litigant acts in reliance on an injunction, it does so subject to the possibility
that the order may later be reversed, vacated, or otherwise dissolved.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, rejected this analysis. He
dissented on the ground that the case had become moot.83 No matter how the
Court ruled, Marshall explained, MITE could not face enforcement
proceedings.84 If the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, the
permanent injunction against enforcement of the Illinois act would remain in
effect.85 But even if the Court concluded that the act was valid and reversed the
lower court’s judgment, MITE still could not be subject to enforcement
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 639–40 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 649 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 655 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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proceedings for its past actions.86 The district court injunction in place at the
time of MITE’s aborted tender offer “barred the Secretary from seeking either
civil or criminal penalties for violations of the Act that occurred” while it was in
effect.87
Justice Marshall declared that federal courts “have the power to issue a
preliminary injunction that offers permanent protection from penalties for
violations of the statute that occurred during the period the injunction was in
effect.”88 He explained that such protection is necessary to facilitate
constitutional challenges to potentially unconstitutional state laws.89 Marshall
noted, “Parties seek to restrain the enforcement of a state statute, not just because
they want short-term protection, but because they desire permanent immunity
for actions they take in reliance on the injunction.”90 Plaintiffs would be far less
likely to sue to attempt to enforce their constitutional rights “when they know
that if they decide to act” pursuant to a preliminary or even permanent
injunction, then “enforcement proceedings might be initiated at some later
stage” should an appellate court overturn the order.91 Consequently, “in the
ordinary case, unless the order contains specific language to the contrary, it
should be presumed that an injunction secures permanent protection from
penalties for violations that occurred during the period it was in effect.”92 Thus,
Marshall concluded that a federal court has the power to completely immunize
litigants’ conduct, even if its constitutional interpretation is later overturned or
otherwise winds up being erroneous. He urged that injunctions presumptively
be read as exercising this power, even absent language expressly addressing the
issue.
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent also concluded that the case was moot and the
permanent injunction should be vacated, but he declined to join Marshall’s
analysis.93 He reasoned that MITE no longer had a live claim for an injunction
since it no longer sought to engage in conduct that violated state law.94 He

86
Id. (“[E]ven if the Court had held that the Illinois Act is constitutional, and had lifted the permanent
injunction that now restrains enforcement of the Act against MITE, there would be no basis for continued
litigation.”).
87
Id. at 656.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 656 n.1.
90
Id. at 658.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 657.
93
Id. at 664, 667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94
Id. at 665 (“[T]he facts that gave rise to this controversy over the constitutionality of Illinois’ antitakeover statutes no longer exist, and it is unlikely that they will be repeated in the future.”).

MORLEY_6.15.22

1152

5/8/2022 8:50 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1137

declared that the “possibility” that the Secretary might pursue an enforcement
action against MITE for its past conduct was “insufficient” to allow the
Secretary’s appeal to remain justiciable.95 In the event the Secretary commenced
an enforcement action, the court in that later case could consider whether the
Illinois act was constitutional and, if so, whether the preliminary injunction
previously in effect afforded MITE a defense.96 Thus, Justice Rehnquist, like the
majority, refused to resolve the issue of whether a vacated injunction could
protect a plaintiff.
The morass of opinions in MITE has left both lower courts and
commentators in disarray. Some courts, consistent with Justice Marshall’s
dissent, have declared that an injunction or declaratory judgment that is later set
aside may serve as a valid defense for actions taken while it remained in effect.97
Others, echoing Justice Stevens’s concurrence, have concluded that erroneous
injunctions provide no such protection.98 And still others, like the majority in

95

Id.
Id. at 666 (stating the case was moot, despite the fact that “resolution of the merits of the instant case
will resolve certain defenses that MITE could raise in an enforcement action were one to be brought by the
Secretary”).
97
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701–02 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d
90, 92 (3d Cir. 1943) (“If the litigant does something, or fails to do something, while under the protection of a
court order he should not, therefore, be subject to criminal penalties for that act or omission.”); W. Watersheds
Project v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 4:10-CV-229, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13771, at *46 (D. Idaho Feb. 2,
2012) (“[A] court order would be a complete defense to prosecution under the Act.”).
98
See, e.g., Occidental Petro. Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., No. 82-1286, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16932, at
*16–17 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 1982) (holding that, where the district court had entered a preliminary injunction
against a state law and the plaintiff made a tender offer without complying with that law, the plaintiff would face
prosecution and civil liability unless the court entered a permanent injunction); Hamilton v. City of Birmingham,
189 So. 776, 779 (Ala. Ct. App. 1939) (“[O]nce the injunction was out of the way, prosecution could proceed—
for acts done at any time within the life of the ordinance . . . .”); State v. Wadhams Oil Co., 134 N.W. 1121,
1123 (Wis. 1912) (“[T]he defendant was subject to the legislative act during the pendency of the preliminary
restraining order, and during this time it acted at its peril in committing any act violating its provisions . . . .”);
see also Willett Co. v. Carpentier, 123 N.E.2d 308, 311 (Ill. 1954) (“A party to a decree cannot acquire any
rights thereunder while the same is subject to review which he can assert after the decree is reversed, since the
effect of the reversal is to abrogate the decree and leave the cause as it stood prior to the entry of the decree.”
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Jonesboro v. Road Dist. No. 8, 58 N.E.2d 884 (Ill. 1945))); cf. Christian Sci. Reading
Room Jointly Maintained v. San Francisco, 807 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, J., dissenting from
denial of reh’g en banc) (noting that the San Francisco airport could “be held in violation of the . . . establishment
clause” in a future case, even if it follows binding circuit precedent, should the Supreme Court interpret the
clause differently); Goshen Cnty. Coop. Beet Ass’n v. Pearson, 706 P.2d 1121, 1126 (Wyo. 1985) (“While the
district court had authority to temporarily prohibit the Association from enforcing the marketing agreements, it
had no authority to permanently immunize the growers against suits for actions taken in violation of valid
contracts.”); State v. Keller, 70 P. 1051, 1054 (Idaho 1902) (holding that, when a federal court enjoined
enforcement of a state law and that injunction was subsequently voided for lack of jurisdiction, it could not
preclude a defendant from being prosecuted for acts taken while the order remained in effect), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Suriner, 294 P.3d 1093, 1100 (Idaho 2013).
96
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MITE, have recognized the difficulty of the issue while leaving it unaddressed.99
Rightsholders are left to question the extent to which preliminary and permanent
injunctions can protect them from civil penalties or prosecution in the event that
those orders are later reversed, vacated, or dissolved.
B. The Writ of Erasure Argument
Professor Jonathan Mitchell argues in a recent Virginia Law Review article
that the government may prosecute people for actions taken under the protection
of preliminary and permanent injunctions that are later set aside as erroneous.100
He attacks what he calls the “writ-of-erasure fallacy,” which he defines as “[t]he
assumption that a judicial pronouncement of unconstitutionality has canceled or
blotted out a duly enacted statute.”101 Mitchell contends that this fallacy arises
in part from the practice of colloquially claiming that federal courts “strike
down” or “invalidate” statutes.102 This terminology leads courts to erroneously
treat their power of judicial review as analogous to a presidential veto or the
authority to “void” federal laws that the Framers had considered vesting in a
Council of Revision (which they ultimately opted against establishing).103
Mitchell explains that when a court concludes that a law is unconstitutional
and enjoins its enforcement, executive officials are barred from enforcing that
provision only while the injunction remains in effect.104 If the injunction is
dissolved, overturned, or vacated, then the parties are returned to the status quo
ex ante. The underlying legal provision—which remained “on the books” the
entire time—may be given full force and effect. The government may enforce
that provision as if the injunction had never been issued.105
99
See, e.g., Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Thomas, 881 F.2d 757, 759–60 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e
leave to a future enforcement action, if any, the issue whether CENEX is insulated from civil and criminal
liability because of its reliance on the district court judgment.”); Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano, Nos.
CV07-1355, CV07-1684, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96194, at *16–17 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2007) (“If the injunction
were lifted, the county attorneys would not be barred from bringing future proceedings for violations that
occurred during the term of the temporary injunction, and it is unsettled whether the interim injunction would
be a defense to the later enforcement actions.”).
100
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 938.
101
Id. at 937 (elaborating that the fallacy arises from a “fail[ure] to recognize that a statute continues to
exist as law even after a court declares it unconstitutional or enjoins its enforcement”).
102
Id. at 935, 944.
103
Id. at 954. The Framers also rejected efforts to give the judiciary a veto power over state laws. Id. at
959–60.
104
Id. at 986–87.
105
See id. at 940 (arguing that the government “can initiate enforcement proceedings against those who
violated the statute while the erstwhile injunction was in effect”); see also id. at 942 (“Those who choose to
violate a duly enacted statute in reliance on the judiciary’s present-day constitutional beliefs expose themselves
to statutory penalties if a future court decides to repudiate its predecessor’s non-enforcement edict.”); id. at 953
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Mitchell adds that a court’s constitutional rulings “will never foreclose a
future court from reviving and enforcing the formerly disapproved statute,”
whether prospectively or retroactively.106 Even a permanent injunction may be
overturned on appeal or vacated based on subsequent Supreme Court rulings.107
And an overturned, vacated, or dissolved injunction “does not prevent the
enjoined officials from enforcing the law against those who violated it” while
the order was in force.108 Accordingly, people may not assume that they “are
free to flout the law . . . without any fear of subsequent prosecution” simply
because a court has enjoined enforcement.109 Mitchell goes so far as to
recommend ways for legislatures to facilitate the enforcement of previously
enjoined laws, such as by tolling statutes of limitations while injunctions remain
in effect, legislatively abolishing a potential mistake of law defense, and
authorizing private enforcement and qui tam suits.110
Mitchell contends that the writ of erasure fallacy arises from a
misunderstanding of the nature of judicial review. But, as Mitchell himself
acknowledges, that understanding traces directly back to the constitutional
convention itself.111 Framers including George Mason,112 James Madison,113 and
James Wilson114 explained judicial review as the power to “declare an
unconstitutional law void”115 or “set aside” unconstitutional laws.116 James
Wilson opined that judges could “refus[e] to give them effect,”117 while Luther
(reiterating that enjoined laws “remain available for the executive to enforce against present-day violators once
the judiciary rescinds its non-enforcement policy”); id. at 987 (“If a court were to dissolve the injunction, the
executive would be free to enforce the statute again—both against those who will violate it in the future and
against those who have violated it in the past.”).
106
Id. at 942.
107
Id. at 939 (“[T]here is always a possibility that a court’s ‘permanent’ injunction will be vacated on
appeal—and even if the injunction survives appellate review it is always possible that a future Supreme Court
will change its interpretation of the Constitution and start enforcing statutes similar or identical to the one that
was ‘permanently’ enjoined.”).
108
Id. at 938.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 948–49.
111
Id. at 945.
112
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS] (statement of Mason).
113
Id. at 93 (statement of Madison) (“A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves,
would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”).
114
Id. at 73 (statement of Wilson).
115
Id. at 78 (statement of Mason).
116
Id. at 27 (statement of Madison); accord id. at 28 (statement of Morris); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (statement
of Gerry).
117
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 112, at 956 (statement of Wilson); see also 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 116, at 97 (statement of Gerry) (stating courts had a “power of deciding on [the] Constitutionality”
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Martin described judicial review as a “negative on the laws.”118 These thoughts
were echoed in the ratification debates119 and the Federalist Papers.120 At least
at first blush, it seems the Constitutional Convention actually provides some
support for a “writ of erasure” understanding of judicial review. Nevertheless,
such brief, general allusions to judicial review at the Convention do not
definitively resolve this issue either way.
C. Problematic Potential Defenses
Perhaps the most obvious objection to subjecting people to civil or criminal
liability based on actions they take under the protection of an injunction is that
it unfairly penalizes their reliance on the law as it existed—or reasonably
appeared to exist—at the time of their actions. But Supreme Court doctrine on
that issue is surprisingly parsimonious. And it starts from a strong presumption
that a court’s new interpretations of a legal provision, as well as its recognition
of other new principles of law, are to be applied retroactively.121
1. Due Process and Ex Post Facto Limitations
The Constitution limits the government’s ability to take adverse action
against a person based on conduct that was legal at the time it was performed.
The extent of those constraints depends in large part on the nature of the
sanctions the government seeks. The Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clauses122
prevent the federal government and states from retroactively criminalizing, or
increasing the penalties for, conduct after it has already occurred.123
The Ex Post Facto Clauses apply only to criminal laws, however.124
Moreover, even within the context of criminal law, the clauses apply only to
retroactively applicable new statutes. The clauses do not extend to judicial

of laws); id. at 109 (statement of King) (explaining that courts “will no doubt stop the operation of such as shall
appear repugnant to the constitution”).
118
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 112, at 76 (statement of Martin).
119
See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 961–62, 962 nn.114–16.
120
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
121
See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (holding that “controlling interpretation[s]
of federal law . . . must be given full retroactive effect . . . as to all events, regardless of whether such events
predate or postdate [the court’s] announcement of the rule”); James B. Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S.
529, 540 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding that “principles of equality and stare decisis” require “a rule of
federal law” to be applied “retroactively”).
122
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
123
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169–70 (1925));
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (Chase, J.).
124
See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001); Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
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rulings that retroactively change a legal provision’s meaning or validity.125 In
the Supreme Court’s view, when a court rejects its own previous interpretation
of a legal provision, it is “not chang[ing] the law,” but rather “explain[ing] what
[the provision] had meant ever since [it] was enacted.”126 The Court’s
longstanding, unduly narrow approach to the Ex Post Facto Clauses renders
them inapplicable to prosecutions for conduct taken under injunctions that are
no longer in force.
The Due Process Clauses,127 in contrast, have somewhat broader
applicability. They require the government to provide “fair notice” of what
conduct is prohibited.128 Unlike the Ex Post Facto Clauses, those provisions
prohibit “unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied
retroactively.”129 Applying this principle, the Supreme Court has held that,
where the Court itself unforeseeably expands the scope of a criminal statute by
overturning one of its own precedents, a defendant who acted prior to that
unexpected reinterpretation cannot be punished for violating the Court’s newly
articulated standards.130
Even this protection has been called largely illusory.131 Due process
restrictions apply only when a judicial reinterpretation is “unexpected and
indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the
conduct in issue.”132 Courts are generally reluctant, however, to find that a

125
See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001) (refusing to “extend[] the strictures of the Ex Post
Facto Clause to the context of common law judging” and emphasizing that “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause, by its
own terms, does not apply to courts”).
126
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 625 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
127
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
128
Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 316 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that a court may not convict a
defendant for conduct that violated its newly adopted interpretation of a statute where the statute itself did not
provide “fair notice” of “a vital element of the offense”).
129
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964); see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
266 (1997) (“[D]ue process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that
neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.” (citations omitted)).
130
See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977) (holding that “since the petitioners were
indicted for conduct occurring prior to our decision in Miller, they are entitled to jury instructions requiring the
jury to acquit unless it finds that the materials involved” violated the Court’s previous, pre-Miller standard);
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 221–22 (1961) (plurality opinion) (overturning Comm’r of Internal
Revenue v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), but reversing the defendant’s conviction because he should have been
tried based on “the gloss” that Wilcox had placed upon the Internal Revenue Code).
131
Cf. Morrison, supra note 33, at 521 (arguing that current Supreme Court doctrine “undermines the
principles of fair warning”).
132
Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 61 (2d ed.
1960)).
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judicial rejection of binding precedent was unforeseeable.133 Unduly preventing
courts from retroactively applying new interpretations of law, the Court has held,
would “place an unworkable and unacceptable restraint on normal judicial
processes and would be incompatible with the resolution of uncertainty that
marks any evolving legal system.”134 Moreover, the Due Process Clauses protect
against unforeseeable judicial rejections only of earlier Supreme Court holdings,
not lower courts’ precedents.135
United States v. Rodgers is perhaps the clearest example of the Court
allowing a defendant to be prosecuted following its rejection of what otherwise
would have been a binding, dispositive precedent.136 In 1967, in Friedman v.
United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit interpreted the
federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001,137 as prohibiting a person
from making false statements to a federal agency only if the statements
concerned matters for which the agency had “the power to make final or binding
determinations.”138 Years later, a defendant within the Eighth Circuit made false
reports to the FBI and Secret Service.139 Applying Friedman, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Section 1001 indictment.140 It
reasoned that Section 1001 was inapplicable since neither the FBI nor the Secret
Service had authority to make a final determination about the defendant’s
allegations.141
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Eighth Circuit had
construed Section 1001 too narrowly.142 Rejecting Friedman, the Court held that
Section 1001 applies to any false statements relating to “the official, authorized
functions of an agency or department.”143 Since the FBI and Secret Service had
the authority to investigate the defendant’s allegations, his alleged statements
violated Section 1001 and the prosecution could proceed.144

133

Morrison, supra note 33, at 479.
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 461 (2001).
135
Morrison, supra note 33, at 483 (“[W]hile individuals may rely on Supreme Court constructions of
criminal statutes, they may not rely on circuit court constructions.”).
136
466 U.S. 475 (1984).
137
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
138
Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1967).
139
United States v. Rodgers, 706 F.2d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
140
Id.
141
Id. at 855–56.
142
Rogers, 466 U.S. at 479 (“[W]e do not think that [Section 1001] . . . admits of the constricted
construction given it by the Court of Appeals.”).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 481–82.
134
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The Court expressly rejected the defendant’s complaint about “retroactive
application” of a new legal standard to his past conduct.145 It was irrelevant that
the defendant’s statements did not violate Section 1001 as construed by binding
Eighth Circuit precedent at the time he uttered them. The Court explained that
any “reliance upon the earlier Friedman decision[] would be unavailing since
the existence of conflicting cases from other Courts of Appeals made review of
that issue by this Court and decision against the position of the respondent
reasonably foreseeable.”146
In other words, the Due Process Clause does not allow people to rely on all
binding judicial interpretations of the law. Rather, they must assess the
likelihood of such rulings being overturned. A defendant may be prosecuted for
performing acts that binding precedent holds are not prohibited when it is
foreseeable that the relevant cases may be overturned. Prudent defendants must
acquaint themselves not only with the law of their respective jurisdictions, but
also with the law of other circuits and states to attempt to gauge how reliable
and robust their jurisdiction’s precedents are. Thus, in United States v. Qualls,
the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc concluded that the Due Process Clause did not
prohibit it from retroactively applying a much broader interpretation of a
criminal statute to a criminal defendant than binding circuit precedent provided
at the time of his offense.147 The court explained that “the circuits were split on
the proper construction of the felon-in-possession statute when [the defendant]
committed the acts for which he was indicted and convicted.”148
The Due Process Clauses provide even less protection against retroactive
application of civil penalties, civil fines, and other such enforcement
mechanisms, like those authorized by S.B.8.149 The Court subjects laws
retroactively imposing new civil liability only to rational basis scrutiny.150 This
145

Id. at 484.
Id.
147
172 F.3d 1136, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); see also Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U.S. 351, 366
(2013) (refusing to grant habeas relief where a state supreme court overturned lower courts’ precedents that had
placed the burden of proof for the defendant’s mental state on the prosecution and applied that new rule
retroactively to past conduct); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994) (holding that the Ninth Circuit
had erred by requiring proof of an overt act in furtherance of a drug conspiracy, even though binding circuit
precedent at the time of the defendant’s conduct had contained that requirement); United States v. Hansen, 9 F.
App’x 955, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying a change in circuit precedent concerning criminal sentencing
retroactively because it was “plainly foreseeable”).
148
Qualls, 172 F.3d at 1138–39 n.1.
149
See Krent, Puzzling Boundary, supra note 33, at 2149 (“[T]he Court has generally sustained any
retroactive enactment in the economic sphere that is supported by a plausible public purpose.”).
150
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984) (holding that Congress may
satisfy the constitutional requirements for applying a civil law retroactively “simply by showing that the
146
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permissive posture also extends to retroactively applicable clarifications of
preexisting law. In General Motors Corp. v Romein, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state law that retroactively overturned the state supreme
court’s interpretation of a previously enacted statute, exposing employers to tens
of millions of dollars of additional liability under that earlier statute.151 When
applying this rational basis standard, the Court typically concludes that statutory
changes may be applied retroactively because such broader application would
further the legislature’s underlying goals to a greater extent.152
Thus, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the Due Process Clauses may provide
only limited constitutional protection against enforcement proceedings for
actions taken under the protection of an injunction that is later overturned. Any
such protection would likely prevent only criminal prosecutions; it would be
inapplicable to either purely civil proceedings or other types of enforcement
proceedings with a punitive component. Even in the criminal context, such
protection may not apply where other circuits or states had reached different
conclusions or expressed uncertainty about the underlying constitutional issues.
And under Rodgers’s reasoning, it may be deemed unreasonable for plaintiffs to
rely on a trial court’s order—especially a preliminary injunction, which is an
interim remedy—unless it is affirmed on appeal, due to the possibility of
subsequent reversal.153 Due process protection would most likely apply
primarily where jurisdictions were in accord on the Constitution’s meaning—
precisely the sort of situation where the injunction would be least likely to be
reversed or vacated in the first place.

retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose”); see Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“[L]egislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely
because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.”).
The Court somewhat mitigates this unfairness by applying a presumption against the retroactive
application of statutes. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) (“Since the early days of this
Court, we have declined to give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private rights unless Congress had made
clear its intent.”). It will not interpret a law as applicable to conduct that occurred before the law’s enactment
absent express language to that effect in the law itself. The Court stated, “Requiring clear intent assures that
Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined
that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” Id. at 272–73.
151
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (“The retroactive repayment provision of the
[later] statute was a rational means of meeting [the state’s] legitimate objective . . . .”).
152
Id. at 191–92; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 730 (“[I]t was eminently rational for Congress
to conclude that the purposes of the [Act] could be more fully effectuated if its withdrawal liability provisions
were applied retroactively.”); Usery, 428 U.S. at 18 (“[T]he imposition of liability for the effects of disabilities
bred in the past is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to those who
have profited from the fruits of their labor . . . .”).
153
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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2. Mistake of Law and Estoppel
Another possibility is that an injunction that is later reversed may give rise
to a mistake of law defense. In general, mistake of law is not a valid defense,154
except where a statute contains a willfulness requirement or other mens rea
element that requires the defendant to be aware that their conduct is illegal.155
The Due Process Clause, however, bars the government from prosecuting a
defendant “for actions undertaken in good faith reliance upon authoritative
assurance that punishment will not attach.”156 Due process can effectively estop
the government from prosecuting someone who was “affirmatively misled by
the responsible administrative agency into believing that the law did not apply
in this situation.”157
But a mistake of law defense might not apply in the context of a preliminary
injunction, where a court is simply predicting whether the challenged legal
provision is likely to be held unconstitutional after full discovery and a trial.158
Such a prediction is sufficient to bar the government from enforcing the
challenged provision while the case is pending. It is less clear, however, that
such a prediction could qualify as a sufficiently “authoritative” interpretation of
the Constitution or other legal provision as to give rise to a mistake of law or
estoppel defense.
It is likewise unclear whether a ruling by a lower court—particularly while
it remains subject to appeal or an appeal is pending159—would be sufficiently
definitive to give rise to a mistake of law defense.160 In Ostrosky v. Alaska, for
example, the defendant was convicted in Alaska state district court for violating
Alaska law by fishing without a license, and the conviction was upheld by the
state superior court.161 He was subsequently convicted of violating the statute
again, but this time the state superior court overturned his conviction on the
grounds that the law violated the state constitution.162 While the state’s appeal
of that ruling was pending before the Alaska Supreme Court, the defendant
154
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or a
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.”).
155
Id. at 201.
156
United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 487 (1967); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959).
157
United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973).
158
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
159
See United States v. Foumai, 910 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1990) (“No expectation of finality can attach
during the period in which either party may appeal.”).
160
Cf. State v. Guice, 621 A.2d 553, 557 n.13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (collecting cases upholding
mistake of law defenses based on overturned or erroneous judicial rulings).
161
913 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 1990).
162
Id.
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violated the statute for a third time and was issued a citation.163 The Alaska
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the law was valid, overturning the
superior court’s ruling in the second prosecution that it was unconstitutional.164
The defendant then challenged the validity of his third prosecution on the
grounds that the State had cited him for fishing after the Alaska superior court
had held the underlying statute unconstitutional in his earlier case, but before the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed that ruling.165 The trial judge in the third
prosecution rejected that argument, holding that “the defense was unavailable to
[the defendant] because he had assumed the risk that the Alaska Supreme Court
would reverse.”166 The defendant was convicted, and the state courts affirmed
his conviction, rejecting his mistake of law argument.167
A federal district court granted the defendant a writ of habeas corpus on due
process grounds,168 but the Ninth Circuit reversed it. The appellate court rejected
the defendant’s argument that he had “a right to rely as a matter of law on [the
Alaska Superior Court] decision in his own case that a statute is unconstitutional
even though the case [was] on appeal to [the Alaska Supreme Court].”169 The
Ninth Circuit held that the state was not required to cease enforcing state law
just because an intermediate court had held it unconstitutional, even though that
ruling had occurred in another case involving the same defendant.170 Because
the defendant knew that the Alaska Supreme Court could overturn the Superior
Court’s ruling, he did not have a due process right to either rely on that ruling or
assert a mistake of law defense based on it.171 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the defendant “had fair notice of the consequences of his action, and his
prosecution was not fundamentally unfair.”172
163

Id.
Id. (citing State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983)).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 593 (citing Ostrosky v. State, 725 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)).
168
Id.
169
Id. at 594.
170
Id. at 596 (“Alaska has the authority to decide, without violating the due process clause, what effect an
Alaska lower court decision that a state statute is unconstitutional will have on the statute’s enforcement and
what authority Alaska superior courts have to bind each other.”).
171
Id. at 597.
172
Id. at 599. The Ninth Circuit had previously held to the contrary in an unrelated case. In United States
v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit declared that a person “should be able to depend
on” the “latest controlling court opinion declaring his activities constitutionally protected . . . until that opinion
is reversed, or at least until the Supreme Court has granted certiorari.” However, following the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Rodgers, see supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc reversed
Albertini on the grounds that a defendant cannot rely on circuit precedent when a circuit split exists. United
States v. Qualls, 172 F.3d 1136, 1138–39 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
164
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Furthermore, it is uncertain whether a defendant can assert a mistake of law
or related due process defense based on a holding about a law’s
unconstitutionality.173 Dean Amar explains, “Someone who acts believing that
her behavior is not criminal under a given statute in the first place is arguably
more innocent than someone who knowingly violates a statute because she feels
it is unconstitutional.”174 Finally, if precedent made clear that the protection
offered by injunctions were as tenuous as the Writ of Erasure theory concludes,
a litigant who obtains an injunction would have the type of notice that would
likely preclude them from raising a mistake of law or estoppel defense against a
retroactive prosecution, should their order later be reversed. Thus, based on
current precedent, if litigants are to be protected for actions taken pursuant to
injunctions that are later eliminated, some other theory is likely necessary.175
II. ERRONEOUS INJUNCTIONS IN PRIVATE LITIGATION
When an appellate court reverses an injunction or a district court dissolves
or rescinds it, the injunction—by definition—is no longer in force. Professor
Mitchell’s Writ of Erasure argument is premised on the notion that “[o]nce the
preliminary order is gone, all the protections conferred by the order go with
it.”176
Yet even a revoked court order can continue to exert legal effect.177 Before
attempting to resolve the difficult questions that arise in constitutional and other
public law cases, it is helpful to lay a foundation by assessing the ongoing legal
consequences of revoked injunctions in private litigation. In a lawsuit between
private litigants arising under the common law or a statutory cause of action,
when a plaintiff takes action under an injunction that is later reversed, vacated,
or dissolved, it is typically not liable to compensate the defendant to the same
extent as if the order had never been entered. And the defendant may not pursue

173
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 995 (noting the uncertainty over whether a defendant may assert a mistake
of law defense when he knew “he was committing an ‘offense’ as defined in a statute, but believed the statute
to be unconstitutional on account of a now-overruled judicial ruling”); Amar, supra note 31, at 672 (“If a statute
gives fair warning that conduct is criminal, that may, in the Court’s eyes, be enough to render such conduct
prosecutable—even if the statute is enjoined for some time by lower courts.”).
174
Amar, supra note 31, at 671–72.
175
A related issue is the extent to which a person who is not protected by an injunction should have a valid
defense when acting pursuant to a binding precedent that is later overturned—the circumstances presented in
Rodgers. The actor in such a situation would be relying on the stare decisis force of a precedent to which they
were not a party. This broader question is beyond the scope of this Article.
176
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 988 n.230.
177
Cf. FIELD, supra note 3, at 4–8 (discussing some potential continuing effects of laws that have been
held unconstitutional).
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the same common law or statutory causes of action against the plaintiff for the
plaintiff’s actions while the injunction was in effect that would otherwise have
been available.
Rather, in general, the only relief for a wrongfully enjoined defendant is an
action to recover damages under the injunction bond, if any, that the court
ordered at the time it issued the injunction178 (and such bonds are not even
available in connection with permanent injunctions179). There are two
exceptions to this rule. First, many jurisdictions will allow a wrongfully enjoined
defendant to bring an independent tort against the plaintiff for malicious
prosecution if the plaintiff sought the preliminary injunction with legal malice
and lacked probable cause.180 Second, several jurisdictions allow a defendant to
seek restitution of specific property that a plaintiff has taken or received from a
defendant pursuant to an overturned court order.181 In the broad run of cases,
however, a defendant’s recovery is limited to the amount of an injunction bond.
The equitable traditions that have evolved concerning injunction bonds offer
two important insights to help guide analysis concerning erroneous injunctions
in public law cases.182 First, judges have broad discretion at many steps of the
process that they may exercise in some cases to deprive a wrongfully enjoined
defendant of any remedy. Second, the fact that a wrongfully enjoined
defendant’s remedy is generally limited to an action on the bond suggests that a
reversed, vacated, or dissolved injunction can continue to have legal

178
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am.,
461 U.S. 757, 770 n.14 (1983) (“A party injured by the issuance of an injunction later determined to be erroneous
has no action for damages in the absence of a bond.”); see also Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 437 (1881)
(“Where no bond or undertaking has been required, it is clear that the court has no power to award damages
sustained by either party in consequence of the litigation . . . .”).
179
See infra note 186.
180
Russell, 105 U.S. at 438 (explaining that injunction bonds arose because the damage arising from
wrongly issued preliminary injunctions was “damnum absque injuria, for which there is no redress except a
decree for the costs of the suit, or, in a proper case, an action for malicious prosecution”); 2 JAMES L. HIGH, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 1593 (4th ed. 1905) (“The better doctrine, however, seems to be that
defendant’s right of action at common law is not merged in the remedy upon the bond, and that an action on the
case will lie. . . . [B]ut there must be distinct allegations of malice or a want of probable cause.”).
181
See, e.g., Dass v. Tosco Corp., 280 F. App’x 571, 571 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. Grosskopf & Medina, supra
note 46, at 908; Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits, 116 YALE L.J. 1284, 1286 (2007) (arguing that, when
considering whether to issue an injunction, a court should consider the likelihood of the plaintiff wrongfully
obtaining “irreparable” benefits for which no practicable mechanism for disgorgement exists).
182
The rules governing injunction bonds apply equally to public law litigation, including constitutional
challenges to legal provisions. Courts in such cases will generally either waive injunction bonds or set them at a
nominal amount. See Rendleman, supra note 46, at 1414. One reason why injunction bonds are a poor fit for
many constitutional cases is that the public interest, which many challenged legal provisions are enacted to
promote, seldom is quantifiable and cannot readily be monetized. Id.
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consequences and protect a plaintiff, at least to some extent, for actions taken
while the injunction remained in effect.
A. Judicial Discretion and Injunction Bonds
Injunctions are equitable remedies.183 Courts of equity have historically
exercised broad discretion over both the breadth of their injunctions, as well as
the terms on which they are awarded.184 These courts came to require that
plaintiffs post bonds as a condition for receiving preliminary injunctions,185 but
not permanent injunctions.186 The bond was generally set in an amount sufficient
to cover “all costs and damages that may accrue to [the defendant] in the event
of the injunction being improperly issued.”187 If the court determined at the end
of the case that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief, then it had
discretion to allow the wrongly enjoined defendant to recover damages up to the
amount of the injunction bond.188 The defendant was limited to the amount of
183

Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211 n.1 (2002).
Russell, 105 U.S. at 438 (“The power to impose such conditions is founded upon, and arises from, the
discretion which the court has in such cases, to grant, or not to grant, the injunction applied for. It is a power
inherent in the court, as a court of equity, and has been exercised from time immemorial.”); see also Meyers v.
Block, 120 U.S. 206, 214 (1887); HIGH, supra note 180, at 1603 (explaining that a court may “requir[e] or
dispens[e] with a bond as the court in the exercise of a sound discretion may deem proper, and if a bond is
required, prescrib[e] its condition and penalty”).
185
Russell, 105 U.S. at 441 (discussing “the power to require security or impose terms before granting an
injunction”); WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS 567 (Edgar
Percy Hewitt et al. eds., 4th ed. 1903) (“When an interlocutory injunction or an interim restraining order is
applied for, the Court will require the plaintiff, as a condition of its interference in his favour, to enter into an
undertaking to abide by any order the Court may make as to damages.”); HIGH, supra note 180, at 1574 (“The
plaintiff in an injunction suit is usually required, as a condition precedent to obtaining an interlocutory injunction,
to file a bond . . . .”).
186
See HIGH, supra note 180, at 1576 (“Nor is a bond necessary where an injunction is granted upon a
final hearing.”); see also KERR, supra note 185, at 591 (discussing “interlocutory injunction[s]” that have “been
granted on the undertaking of the plaintiff as to damages”); see, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512,
516 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The purpose of an injunction bond is to compensate the defendant, in the event he prevails
on the merits, for the harm that an injunction entered before the final decision caused him, and so it is required
only for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), not for a permanent
injunction.”); cf. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. McKnight, 244 U.S. 368, 373–74 (1917) (explaining that a
defendant may recover on an injunction bond for damages suffered while an erroneous interlocutory injunction
remained in effect, but not for damages incurred after issuance of a permanent injunction that is later reversed
(citing Houghton v. Meyer, 208 U.S. 149, 160 (1908))); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Accord Healthcare Inc., No.
18-1043, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235763, at *7 (D. Del. Dec. 15, 2020) (holding that an injunction bond entered
in connection with a preliminary injunction must be dissolved despite the fact that the permanent injunction was
being appealed because the defendant was not “entitled to a bond against the permanent injunction”).
187
HIGH, supra note 180, at 1574–75.
188
See Russell, 105 U.S. at 444, 446 (noting the default rule that, in the absence of a statute, court rule, or
contrary language in the bond, the court may order the plaintiffs to “pay such damages as the parties enjoined
may sustain by reason of the injunction”); KERR, supra note 185, at 591 (“[T]he Court is not bound to grant an
inquiry as to damages in every case in which the injunction is dissolved, or the action is dismissed at trial. The
184
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the bond, however, even if its damages wound up being greater.189 And if the
trial court did not require a bond, then the defendant was barred from recovering
any damages.190
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) codifies these traditional equitable
principles. It allows a court to issue a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order “only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court
considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to
have been wrongfully enjoined.”191 Rule 62(d) contains similar provisions
concerning appeal bonds for staying preliminary or permanent injunctions
pending appeal.192 Such stays are functionally similar to injunctions in their own
right.193
These rules raise three main interpretive issues concerning the scope of a
court’s discretion. First, courts have sharply disagreed over whether trial courts
must impose bond requirements when granting preliminary injunctions. Second,
jurisdictions have likewise differed on the extent of a court’s discretion in setting
the amount of a bond. Third, conflicting approaches exist about whether courts
retain discretion over whether to allow a wrongfully enjoined party to recover
damages under a bond.
1. Mandating a Bond
Rule 65(c)’s language appears to mandate that courts impose bond
requirements when issuing preliminary injunctions. It provides, “The court may
issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant
gives security.”194 Rule 65(c)’s language can be traced back to the Clayton Act

Court has a discretion, and . . . must be satisfied that the injunction was improperly obtained and that under all
the circumstances of the case damages ought to be given.”).
189
HIGH, supra note 180, at 1582 (“But when an injunction is granted upon condition that a bond shall be
filed in a given sum, which is done, and no further order is made as to the damages, defendants are limited in
their recovery of damages to the amount of the penalty in the bond.”).
190
Id. at 1607–08 (“[A]n independent suit for damages resulting from the granting of an injunction which
is afterward dissolved can not be maintained where no bond was filed at the time the injunction was granted.”).
191
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). The rule goes on to state that the United States, its officers, and federal agencies
“are not required to give security.” Id. States vary greatly in their bonding requirements. Some state rules make
injunction bonds mandatory in some, most, or all cases, while others expressly vest discretion with the trial
judge. Dobbs, supra note 46, at 1097–99.
192
FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d) (“While an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment”
granting, denying, or modifying an injunction, “the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction
on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”).
193
See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428, 434 (2009).
194
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c) (emphasis added).
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of 1914, which mandated bonds for preliminary injunctions in labor disputes.195
Circuits have split, however, on whether the bonding requirement is mandatory,
adopting three distinct approaches.196
Some circuits have held that an injunction bond is always required as a
condition precedent for a preliminary injunction.197 Under this approach, “the
absence of a bond precludes issuance of an injunction.”198 The Third Circuit has
gone so far as to declare that “[t]he District Court must set a bond even where
the parties have neglected to raise the issue.”199 Even concern that the bond
requirement may “chill[]” litigants from enforcing their rights “cannot justify
excusing [it].”200
Other jurisdictions have held that bonds are generally required, except under
certain circumstances.201 For example, a court may waive a bond requirement in
cases brought in the “public interest,” especially under a federal health or
welfare statute.202 Several scholars oppose bond requirements in public interest
195

Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 18, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 26).
Dobbs, supra note 46, at 1100–01.
197
Md. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 976 F.2d 1462, 1483 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he decision
whether to require a bond is strictly circumscribed by the terms of Rule 65(c). . . . Failure to require a bond
before granting preliminary injunctive relief is reversible error.”); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903
F.2d 186, 210 (3d Cir. 1990); Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1145 (3d Cir.
1977) (“[A] district court commits reversible error when it fails to require the posting of a security bond by the
successful applicant for a preliminary injunction.”). Under this categorical approach, a court need not require a
bond if it makes a finding that the injunction will not cause compensable harm to the enjoined parties. See
Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 426 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court lacks discretion
under Rule 65(c) to waive a bond requirement except in the exceptionally narrow circumstance where the nature
of the action necessarily precludes any monetary harm to the defendant . . . .”); accord Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr.,
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988).
198
Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 322 (3d Cir. 2020); Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank,
894 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff “is not entitled to a preliminary injunction unless he
posts security indemnifying [the defendant] against the financial losses it might suffer as a result of a wrongful
injunction”).
199
Tilden Recreational Vehicles, Inc. v. Belair, 786 F. App’x 335, 343 (3d Cir. 2019).
200
Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 211.
201
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), appears to embrace this
approach. He wrote, “[G]enerally the moving party must demonstrate confidence in his legal position by posting
bond in an amount sufficient to protect his adversary from loss in the event that future proceedings prove that
the injunction issued wrongfully.” Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
202
Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 826 F.3d 1030, 1043 (8th Cir.
2016) (“[I]t was permissible for the district court to waive the bond requirement based on its evaluation of public
interest in this specific case.”); Pharm. Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 50 F.3d 1168,
1175 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that, because the plaintiff had sued “to enforce ‘public interests’ rising out of a
comprehensive health and welfare statute, . . . the district court’s waiver of the bond requirement was proper”).
Some commentators have encouraged this approach. See, e.g., Morton, supra note 46, at 1904 (“In
noncommercial cases, such as those involving the vindication of constitutional rights or public benefits rights
under a federal statute, waiver may be appropriate.”).
196
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cases, particularly environmental cases, on the grounds that many plaintiff
groups cannot afford them and already face substantial disincentives to pursuing
meritless litigation.203
Still other circuits have concluded that, “[c]ontrary to the strong language of
Rule 65(c),” a district court has complete discretion as to whether to require a
bond.204 These courts have generally reasoned that because district courts
determine the bond amount, they may set the amount at zero, thus “dispens[ing]
with the filing of a bond.”205 If the court chooses to forego a bond, however, it
must be an affirmative decision rather than a failure to consider the issue.206
The First Circuit, applying the discretionary approach, has identified a range
of factors for district courts to consider in deciding whether to impose an
injunction bond.207 “First, at least in noncommercial cases, the court” must
weigh “the possible loss to the enjoined party” against “the hardship that a bond
requirement would impose on the applicant.”208 The court does not weigh this
factor heavily in commercial cases because commercial parties are presumed to
be “capable of bearing most bond requirements.”209 Second, the court considers
the bond requirement’s impact on the plaintiff’s ability to enforce its federal
rights.210 The court is less likely to require a bond “where the applicant is an
individual and the enjoined party an institution that otherwise has some control
over the applicant.”211 This factor is less important “where both parties are
203
See Calderon, supra note 46, at 165–66 (arguing that, due to the requirements for a preliminary
injunction, “[d]efendants in public interest cases are thus well-screened from the issuance of an erroneous
injunction, even without the ‘screening’ device provided by a bond”); Henson & Gray, supra note 46, at 551–
52 (arguing injunction bonds are unnecessary to protect against baseless preliminary injunctions because
attorneys have a duty not to file frivolous suits, public interest lawyers have “a detailed knowledge of complex
areas of fact and law,” the “enormous expense of time and money involved in litigation” deters frivolous filings,
and many public interest groups require internal review of lawsuits before they are filed).
204
See NACCO Materials Handling Grp. v. Toyota Material Handling USA, Inc., 246 F. App’x 929, 952–
53 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] court has no mandatory duty to impose a bond as a condition for issuance of injunctive
relief.” (citing Roth v. Bank of Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 538 (6th Cir. 1978))); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers v. E. Airlines, Inc., 925 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he provisions of Rule 65(c) are not
mandatory and . . . a district court retains substantial discretion to dictate the terms of an injunction bond.”).
205
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1976).
206
See Roth, 583 F.2d at 539 (holding that the district judge erred by “fail[ing] to exercise the discretion
required of him by Rule 65(c) by expressly considering the question of requiring a bond”).
207
Crowley v. Loc. No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen,
& Packers, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984); accord In re
Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 1986).
208
Crowley, 679 F.2d at 1000.
209
Id.
210
Id. The court did not address how this consideration would apply in the context of a diversity suit
involving state-law rights. See id.
211
Id.
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individuals or institutions.”212 Finally, while the strength of the plaintiff’s case
is typically not a consideration—since that has already been factored into the
underlying decision to grant an injunction in the first place—a court seldom must
require a bond “[i]n cases where the likelihood of success is extraordinarily
high.”213 Thus, many jurisdictions accord district courts discretion, at least in
some cases, over whether to require a bond at all.
2. Setting the Bond Amount
Circuits similarly vary as to the amount of the bond a court must require.
Some jurisdictions, while alluding to a district court’s discretion, require the
bond to be set at an amount that will compensate the defendant for its anticipated
losses as a result of the injunction.214 When calculating the amount of a
defendant’s potential losses, the court must consider the defendant’s ability to
mitigate damages.215 Under this approach, if a defendant is unable to show that
the order is likely to cause substantial harm, then the bond may be set at a low
amount.216
Other cases, in contrast, hold that the amount of the injunction bond is
completely within a court’s discretion.217 Some circuits have ruled that a trial
212

Id.
Id. at 1000 n.25.
214
See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The amount
of the bond, then, ordinarily depends on the gravity of the potential harm to the enjoined party . . . .”); Glenwood
Bridge, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 940 F.2d 367, 373 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that an injunction bond must be
“in an amount that fairly protects” the defendant “should it be ultimately found that the [defendant] has been
wrongfully enjoined”); see, e.g., Howmedica Osteonics v. Zimmer Inc., 461 F. App’x 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2012);
Rathmann Grp. v. Tanenbaum, 889 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The $10,000 that [the plaintiff] posted
pursuant to the [temporary restraining order] thus is inadequate to protect [the defendant] in the event that a trial
on the merits results in a decision in his favor.”).
215
See Div. No. 1, Detroit, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Consol. Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218, 1229 (6th
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he failure to consider mitigating the possibility of lost business before setting an extravagant
injunction bond on that basis was an abuse of discretion.”).
216
See, e.g., Candle Factory, Inc. v. Trade Assocs. Grp., 23 F. App’x 134, 138–40 (4th Cir. 2001) (setting
a nominal bond because “any injury to [the defendant] from issuance of the Preliminary Injunction would be
slight”). Under this approach, the amount can be zero if the enjoined party is not likely to suffer any compensable
damages. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d
665, 675 (2d Cir. 1961)); Hoechst Diafoil, 174 F.3d at 421–22 n.3.
217
See Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 332 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court retains the discretion to
set the bond amount as it sees fit . . . .”); BellSouth Telecommc’ns, Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission
Servs., LLC, 425 F.3d 964, 971 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding the same); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. E. Airlines, Inc., 925 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding the same); Frank’s GMC Truck Ctr., Inc. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he amount of the bond is left to the discretion of the
court . . . .”); Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, S.A., 569 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The amount of
security required is a matter for the discretion of the trial court; it may elect to require no security at all.”);
Stockslager v. Carroll Elec. Coop., 528 F.2d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The amount of the bond rests within the
213
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judge’s discretion to set the bond “in such sum as the court deems proper”
includes authority to set a minimal bond or to even set the amount at zero (thus
essentially negating the bond requirement).218 Courts are particularly likely to
take advantage of this discretion in “public interest” cases.219 When a bond is set
at zero, a wrongfully enjoined party is generally unable to seek compensation if
the injunction is reversed, vacated, or dissolved.220
A litigant may ask the trial court to increase or decrease the amount of the
bond while the injunction remains in effect.221 Any such changes must be purely
prospective. When an injunction is reversed or vacated on appeal, the appellate
court will generally decline to retroactively increase the bond amount, even if it
was erroneously low and insufficient to compensate the enjoined party for the
harm it suffered.222 Such courts reason that part of the bond’s purpose is to notify
the plaintiff as to the maximum amount of its potential liability.223 Retroactive
adjustments to the bond amount would subject plaintiffs to unanticipatedly high
liability.224
sound discretion of the trial court . . . .”).
218
See, e.g., Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P 65(c)
and citing Corrigan Dispatch, 569 F.2d at 303); Md. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 976 F.2d 1462,
1483 (4th Cir. 1992); Cont’l Oil Co. v. Frontier Refin. Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1964).
219
City of Atlanta v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 636 F.2d 1084, 1094 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding
the court’s refusal to require an injunction bond where “plaintiffs were engaged in public-interest litigation, an
area in which the courts have recognized an exception to the Rule 65 security requirement”).
220
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 770 n.14 (1983) (“A party injured by the issuance of an injunction later
determined to be erroneous has no action for damages in the absence of a bond.”); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F.
Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 804 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] defendant wrongfully enjoined has recourse only against
the bond.”); In re Ladner, 799 F.2d 1023, 1025–26 (5th Cir. 1986) (adopting the “no bond, no damages” rule).
221
See, e.g., Dass v. Tosco Corp., 136 F. App’x 21, 24 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s
decision to increase the amount of an injunction bond based on the district court’s estimate of the defendant’s
“potential damages resulting from the injunction”); cf. Bebe Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Int’l, 313 F.3d
1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 2002) (remanding for the district court to consider whether to increase the injunction bond
amount).
222
Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. CAT Commc’ns, Int’l, Inc., 335 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A retroactive
increase in the amount of an injunction bond on dissolution or reversal is generally improper.”); accord Scanvec
Amiable Ltd. v. Chang, 80 F. App’x 171, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2003); Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 969 (3d
Cir. 1992) (“We likewise will not hold that a party who accepts the benefit of a preliminary injunction by posting
a nominal bond implicitly agrees to post a larger bond if unsuccessful on appeal . . . .”).
223
Nokia Corp. v. Interdigital, Inc., 645 F.3d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the bond provides the
plaintiff with notice of the maximum extent of its potential liability” should the injunction prove to be erroneous);
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 210 n.31 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Plaintiffs too derive some
protection from the bond requirement, for defendants injured by wrongfully issued preliminary injunctions can
recover only against the bond itself.”); Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc., 873 F.2d 801, 803–04 (5th Cir. 1989)
(noting that the amount of an injunction bond establishes the plaintiff’s “reasonable expectations” about the
extent of its potential liability).
224
See Sprint Commc’ns Co., 335 F.3d at 240–41 (“If a retroactive increase is permissible, the injunction
bond is no longer cabined; the bond no longer fixes exposure nor caps liability. A retroactive increase subjects

MORLEY_6.15.22

1170

5/8/2022 8:50 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1137

For example, in Sprint Communications Co. v. CAT Communications
International, Inc., the district court awarded Sprint a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the defendant’s customers from using Sprint’s long-distance
telephone network.225 It imposed an injunction bond of $250,000.226 Almost two
years later, the defendant moved to increase the amount of the bond and vacate
the order.227 The district court dissolved the injunction based on a revised view
of Sprint’s likelihood of success on the merits228 and retroactively increased the
bond to $4.95 million to fully compensate the defendant for the expenses it had
incurred over the preceding two-year period to comply with the order.229 The
Third Circuit affirmed the injunction’s dissolution but reversed the modification
of the injunction bond on the grounds that such a “retroactive increase” would
subject the plaintiff “to an unexpected and unanticipated liability.”230
3. Recovering Under the Bond
Courts have also disagreed as to whether wrongly enjoined parties have the
right to recover their damages up to the amount of the injunction bond, or the
award of such relief is instead discretionary. Some courts have held that a victim
of a wrongful injunction has the “right to pursue recovery on the security
bond.”231 Others have held that wrongfully enjoined parties are entitled only “to
a presumption in favor of recovery against the bond for provable damages.”232
Among the considerations that these latter courts have taken into account in
calculating the amount of recovery are “the resources of the parties, the
defendant’s efforts or lack thereof to mitigate his damages, and the outcome of
the underlying suit.”233

the successful applicant to an unexpected and unanticipated liability.”).
225
Id. at 238.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 239.
228
Id. at 242.
229
Id. at 239.
230
Id. at 241, 243.
231
Div. No. 1, Detroit, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Consol. Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218, 1225 (6th Cir.
1988) (emphasis added); Atomic Oil Co. of Okla. v. Bardahl Oil Co., 419 F.2d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 1969).
232
Nokia Corp. v. Interdigital, Inc., 645 F.3d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Glob.
NAPs Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A] district court must have a good
reason to depart from the preference for recovery of security granted under Rule 65(c).”); Coyne-Delany Co. v.
Cap. Dev. Bd. of Ill., 717 F.2d 385, 392 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing “the implicit presumption in Rule[] . . .
65(c) in favor of awarding” recovery under an injunction bond).
233
Coyne-Delany Co., 717 F.2d at 392; see also Nokia, 645 F.3d at 559 (“Good reasons to deny recovery
of all or a portion of the alleged damages would be that the damages sought were unreasonable in amount or that
a party failed to mitigate them.”).
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In contrast, some other jurisdictions have granted district courts complete
discretion “to weigh the equities of the particular case in awarding or denying
damages resulting from a preliminary injunction wrongfully obtained.”234 As
one such circuit noted, Rule 65(c) “does not contemplate that a defendant who
is wrongfully enjoined will always be made whole by recovery of damages.”235
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Russell v. Farley,
which predated Rule 65(c) by over a half-century.236
B. Implications of Injunction Bonds
The longstanding equitable principles governing injunction bonds
demonstrate that injunctions can continue to affect litigants’ rights even after
they have been reversed, vacated, or dissolved. When a court enters a
preliminary injunction authorizing a plaintiff to take actions that would
otherwise violate a defendant’s common law or statutory rights, that defendant
may not sue the plaintiff for those violations once the injunction is lifted. Rather,
the defendant’s sole remedy is generally limited to an action against the
injunction bond itself.237 And, as we have seen, many circuits allow courts to
decline to impose injunction bonds,238 set the bond amount at zero,239 or even
bar the defendant from recovering on a bond.240 In such cases, not only are the
defendant’s statutory or common law remedies eliminated by the nownonexistent preliminary injunction but the defendant is also left without an
alternate means of seeking compensation for the admittedly wrongful harm it
suffered.
The situation with permanent injunctions is even starker. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not provide for injunction bonds in connection with
permanent injunctions241 and courts of equity have no tradition of imposing
them.242 When a permanent injunction is overturned on appeal or otherwise

234
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Holliday, No. 91-1675, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 9819, at *16–17 (4th Cir. May
6, 1992); Page Commc’ns Eng’rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that a court has
“discretion to refuse to award damages [under an injunction bond], in the interest of equity and justice”); H & R
Block, Inc. v. McCaslin, 541 F.2d 1098, 1099 (5th Cir. 1976).
235
Page Commc’ns Eng’rs, 475 F.2d at 997.
236
105 U.S. 433, 446 (1881) (holding that the district court “had power to decide” that, “under the
circumstances of the case,” no damages “ought to be recovered” under an injunction bond).
237
See supra notes 178–79, 188–90 and accompanying text.
238
See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
239
See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
240
See supra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.
241
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).
242
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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vacated,243 the defendant’s only remedy is a restitution claim for the return of
any money or property it transferred to the plaintiff or the fair market value of
goods or services it provided pursuant to the injunction.244 The defendant may
not recover any additional consequential, statutory, or other damages to which
it would have been entitled had the plaintiff performed the same actions without
the protection of an injunction.
Thus, in private litigation, the fact that a court reverses an injunction does
not return the parties to the status quo ex ante. Although a revoked order cannot
provide prospective protection for future conduct, it is not treated as void ab
initio.245 Even an erroneously issued injunction that is later revoked can limit the
nature, scope, and amount of the plaintiff’s potential liability to the defendant
for its past actions while the injunction had been in effect.
III. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF ERRONEOUS INJUNCTIONS
The Court’s jurisprudence regarding injunctions reveals another way in
which reversed, vacated, or dissolved injunctions can continue to have legal
effect: a previously enjoined party may be held in criminal contempt for past
violations of them. “An enjoined party is required to obey an injunction issued
by a federal court within its jurisdiction even if the injunction turns out on review
to have been erroneous, and failure to obey such an injunction is punishable by
contempt.”246 Under the collateral bar doctrine, a respondent charged with
contempt generally may not challenge the injunction’s validity as a defense,
even if he claims the underlying statute that the injunction is enforcing is
unconstitutional.247 This rule arises from “a belief that in the fair administration
243

See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 18 (Am. L. Inst. 2010) (“A
transfer or taking of property, in compliance with or otherwise in consequence of a judgment that is subsequently
reversed or avoided, gives the disadvantaged party a claim in restitution as necessary to avoid unjust
enrichment.”); see, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“The
law of restitution also has broad application in cases where money is transferred pursuant to a court order that is
subsequently reversed.”).
245
One might question whether the collateral consequences of an injunction that a court lacked jurisdiction
to enter should be treated differently than those of an injunction that proved to be merely erroneous or an abuse
of discretion on the merits. See Doug Rendleman, More on Void Orders, 7 GA. L. REV. 246, 246 (1973)
(discussing “the distinction between void and erroneous orders”). This will seldom be an issue with regard to
federal injunctions against allegedly invalid legal provisions. Federal district courts have general federalquestion jurisdiction over litigation arising under the U.S. Constitution, Administrative Procedures Act, and
other authorities for challenging the validity of legal provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
246
Firefighters Loc. Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 600 n.5 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967) (quoting Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181,
189–90 (1922)); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
& Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 769 (1983) (“Courts have sufficient contempt powers to protect their
244
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of justice no man can be judge in his own case.”248 An enjoined party who
believes an injunction is invalid generally must first seek relief from the courts,
rather than unilaterally deciding to violate it.249
The collateral bar rule thus allows for enforcement of injunctions regardless
of whether they are substantively invalid or even unconstitutional.250 But the
Court has gone even further. As a corollary to the collateral bar rule, the Court
has held that a person may be held in criminal contempt for violating an
injunction while it was in effect, even after that order is reversed or otherwise
invalidated.251 In Donovan v. City of Dallas, a group of Dallas residents lost a
state-court class action case in which they had sought to prevent the city from
issuing bonds to build an additional runway at Love Field airport.252 Some of
the residents who brought that case, along with others who had not been involved
with it, filed a subsequent federal lawsuit seeking similar relief.253 The Texas
Supreme Court directed the Texas Court of Civil Appeals to issue an order
prohibiting the residents from maintaining their federal case.254 When the
residents proceeded with their federal claims in violation of the order, the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals held them in contempt.255 It imposed a fine on each
plaintiff and a twenty-day jail sentence on their attorney.256
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari for both the Texas Supreme
Court’s order to enter the injunction, as well as the residents’ ensuing contempt
injunctions, even if the injunctions are issued erroneously.”); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the
U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980).
248
Walker, 388 U.S. at 320.
249
The Court has suggested that two exceptions may exist to the collateral bar doctrine. The doctrine might
be inapplicable, first, to “transparently invalid” orders, id. at 315, or second, when the issuing court improperly
delays adjudicating a challenge to the order, id. at 318. The Court invoked a variation of the latter exception in
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 470 (1975), in which it held that an attorney who advises a litigant to disobey
a court’s order to reveal information at trial on Fifth Amendment grounds may contest that order’s validity in a
later contempt proceeding. The Court explained that “[c]ompliance” with such an order “could cause irreparable
injury because appellate courts cannot always ‘unring the bell’ once the information has been released.
Subsequent appellate vindication does not necessarily . . . totally repair[] the error.” Id. at 460.
250
Walker, 388 U.S. at 314 (holding that an injunction “must be obeyed . . . however erroneous the action
of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a . . . void law going to the merits
of the case” (quoting Howat, 258 U.S. at 189–90)); see also Maness, 419 U.S. at 458 (“Persons who make private
determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even if the order is
ultimately ruled incorrect.”).
251
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 414 (1964) (remanding the case so the state court could
decide whether to punish petitioners for contempt of an invalid injunction).
252
Id. at 408–09.
253
Id. at 409.
254
Id. at 410.
255
Id.
256
Id.
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convictions.257 The Court held that the injunction was invalid because the state
courts were “without power to enjoin these litigants from prosecuting their
federal-court action.”258 It also vacated the residents’ contempt convictions,
explaining that it was uncertain “[w]hether the Texas court would have punished
petitioners for contempt had it known that the restraining order petitioners
violated was invalid.”259 Rather than entering final judgment on the grounds that
the underlying injunction was invalid, however, the Court remanded the case
back to Texas state court specifically to allow that court to decide whether the
residents should be punished for violating the overturned order.260
Thus, even after declaring the injunction invalid,261 the Court not only
recognized but also affirmatively facilitated the possibility that the state court
could hold the wrongfully enjoined parties in contempt for violating it. Lower
courts have likewise recognized that “contempt of an order later held beyond the
court’s power to issue may nevertheless be punished.”262 Such “punishment is
to vindicate the court’s authority which has been equally flouted whether or not
the command was right.”263
Yet again, erroneous injunctions continue to exert legal consequences even
after they have been reversed and are no longer in existence. The Court’s
corollary to the collateral bar rule treats an injunction as definitively establishing
an enjoined party’s rights and obligations for the period it remains in effect,
regardless of whether the order turns out to be erroneous and is later reversed.
An injunction should likewise dispositively establish the plaintiff’s rights and
obligations for that period, as well.

257

Id. at 411.
Id. at 411–12.
259
Id. at 414.
260
Id. (“[S]ince that question was neither considered nor decided by the Texas court, we leave it for
consideration by that court on remand.”).
261
Id. (“[P]etitioners have been punished for disobeying an invalid order.”).
262
Mann v. Calumet City, 588 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2009); see also State ex rel. Mix v. Newland, 560
P.2d 255, 260–61 (Or. 1977) (“[T]he trial court may, in its discretion, impose some appropriate sanction on
defendant for his contempt of its earlier injunction . . . , even though that order has subsequently been found to
be invalid.”); see, e.g., Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Our
determination that the sanctions were invalid does not dictate the conclusion that Krislov should not have been
held in contempt for the failure to pay those sanctions within the time ordered.”); United States v. Dickinson,
465 F.2d 496, 514 (5th Cir. 1972) (remanding the case to the district court “for a determination of whether the
judgment of contempt or the punishment therefor would still be deemed appropriate in light of the fact that the
order disobeyed was constitutionally infirm”); Dunn v. United States, 388 F.2d 511, 512–13 (10th Cir. 1968)
(applying Donovan under analogous circumstances).
263
Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F.2d 727, 727 (2d Cir. 1936) (per
curiam).
258
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IV. PROTECTIVE EFFECTS OF ERRONEOUS INJUNCTIONS
If a court concludes that a legal provision is unconstitutional or otherwise
invalid—either facially or as applied under certain circumstances—then it
generally must ignore that provision in the course of adjudicating the case,
refusing to afford it legal effect.264 When the enforcement or threat of
enforcement of such an invalid provision threatens to inflict irreparable harm on
a litigant, the court may enjoin its enforcement.265 In these cases, the court draws
its authority from a higher source of law than the challenged provision itself.266
This reasoning is inapplicable, however, when an injunction enjoining a
legal provision is reversed, vacated, or overturned. In such cases, the judiciary
has ultimately concluded that a higher source of law does not actually prevent
the government from enforcing the challenged provision. Some alternate source
of authority is therefore necessary for a court to be able to displace a defendant’s
legal rights, such as by replacing a wrongfully enjoined party’s common law or
statutory causes of action against the plaintiff with a discretionary action on an
injunction bond or restitution claim,267 or allowing a wrongfully enjoined party
to be prosecuted for criminal contempt for engaging in otherwise lawful
conduct.268 Such an alternate source of authority would likewise be necessary to
empower a court to prevent a wrongfully enjoined governmental defendant (i.e.,
a federal or state agency or official) from prosecuting or seeking other punitive
sanctions, such as statutory damages or civil penalties, against a plaintiff that
violated a legal provision that had been subject to a since-vacated injunction.
Earlier, we saw that the most seemingly applicable defenses—the Ex Post Facto
Clauses, due process notice requirements, and mistake of law—may be
insufficient to cover the broad run of such cases.269 This Part suggests two
alternate sources of authority: (1) the Article III judicial power for permanent
injunctions, and (2) the federal equity power for both preliminary and permanent
injunctions. After exploring these sources of constitutional authority, this Part
goes on to explore the various ways in which courts may exercise them.

264

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803).
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908).
266
A court may enjoin a federal statute on the grounds that it violates the U.S. Constitution. It may enjoin
a federal regulation when the regulation violates either a federal statute’s procedural or substantive requirements
or the U.S. Constitution. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2018). And, subject to the restrictions on federal preemption
doctrine, a state legal provision may be enjoined for violating either a federal regulation, federal statute, or the
U.S. Constitution. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479–80 (2018).
267
See supra Part II.
268
See supra Part III.
269
See supra Part I.C.
265
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A. The Judicial Power
The Article III judicial power should be construed as empowering federal
courts to ensure that their judgments dispositively adjudicate the rights and
duties of litigants for the period in which such judgments remain in effect.
Litigants generally should not be subject to proceedings with a punitive
component for actions taken in reliance on judgments to which they are parties,
specifically including permanent injunctions, even if those judgments are later
reversed or vacated.
Article III vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” in the federal
judiciary.270 An essential element of the judicial power is the authority to issue
final judgments adjudicating the rights of the litigants in a case.271 Of course,
such judgments may be stayed272 or reversed on appeal.273 But while a judgment
remains in effect, its essential attribute is dispositiveness: litigants may
prospectively rely on a judgment as a binding statement of their rights and
duties.274 Should the judgment be reversed, overturned, or vacated, it no longer
continues to have any such prospective effect. But, unless the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to issue the judgment,275 it is not void ab initio.

270

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (“[T]he Framers crafted this charter
of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not
merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy
. . . .”); see also William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO L.J. 1807, 1809 (2008) (“[T]he judicial power
vested in Article III courts allows them to render binding judgments that must be enforced by the Executive
Branch so long as those courts have jurisdiction over the case.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1989–90) (defining the “judicial Power” as “one to render dispositive
judgments”).
272
See FED. R. CIV. P. 62.
273
Even an initially correct judgment may require reversal if the legislature changes the underlying
substantive law while the appeal is pending. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110
(1801) (“[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied.”).
274
See Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 272 (2015) (noting that courts “reduce their opinions and
verdicts to judgments precisely to define the parties’ rights and liabilities”); Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285,
289 (1907) (“If rights between litigants are once established by the final judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction those rights must be recognized in every way, and wherever the judgment is entitled to respect, by
those who are bound by it.”); City of Chanute v. Trader, 132 U.S. 210, 214 (1889) (“The rights of the parties to
the judgment, in respect of its subject-matter, were fixed by its being rendered.”); see also Morley v. Lake Shore
& M.S. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 162, 175 (1892) (“The effect of a judgment is to fix the rights of the parties thereto
by the solemn adjudication of a court having jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).
275
See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 (Am. L. Inst. 1980); see, e.g., State v. Sams, 345
S.E.2d 179, 182 (N.C. 1986) (“An order is void ab initio only when it is issued by a court that does not have
jurisdiction.”).
271
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These principles are clearest regarding declaratory judgments, which are
often sought in conjunction with injunctions in public law challenges.276 The
Declaratory Judgment Act empowers a federal court to “declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.”277 A
declaratory judgment “declares conclusively and finally the rights of the parties
in litigation[] over a contested issue”278 and “constitut[es] res judicata.”279
The “very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act [is] to ameliorate” the
“dilemma” of having to choose between avoiding the risk of prosecution or other
penalties for violating a seemingly invalid legal provision by refraining from
exercising one’s claimed rights, on the one hand, and exposing oneself to
punitive consequences by exercising one’s claimed rights in violation of that
provision, on the other.280 A declaratory judgment allows litigants to obtain
binding judicial declarations of their rights in advance of committing potentially
illegal acts281—to “remove[] all that peril.”282 As Representative Gilbert
explained during debates over the statute’s enactment, “Under the present law
you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you stepped into a

276
See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1143 (2014)
(“The declaratory judgment and the injunction are rough substitutes.”); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 466 (1974) (discussing the close relationship between injunctions and declaratory judgments). But see
Morley, supra note 4, at 2458–59 (identifying certain circumstances in which it is particularly important for
people to have their rights protected by an injunction rather than a declaratory judgment).
277
Pub. L. No. 73-343, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2018)).
278
S. REP. NO. 73-1005, at 2 (1934); see also Edwin Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act,
21 VA. L. REV. 35, 47 (1934) (“[T]he declaratory judgment is a final judgment like any coercive judgment
conclusively determining the rights of the parties . . . .”).
279
Borchard, supra note 278, at 47.
280
Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967) (citing S. REP. NO. 73-1005, at 2–3, and Edwin
Borchard, Challenging “Penal” Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L.J. 445, 454 (1943)); see also
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134 (2007) (“The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large
building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk . . . the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a declaration of
its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.”); Bituminous Coal Operators’ Ass’n v. Int’l
Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 585 F.2d 586, 596 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he declaratory remedy may be
resorted to before there has been a change in the status quo which results in injury . . . .”); Declaratory
Judgments: Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 16 (1928)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Professor Borchard, noting the statement of Benjamin Cardozo, C.J.,
N.Y. Ct. App.) (explaining that the Declaratory Judgment Act could be used where people “would otherwise
have acted at their peril”).
281
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 468 n.18 (1974) (urging that declaratory judgments “be issued,
instead of compelling a violation of the statute as a condition precedent to challenging its constitutionality”
(quoting Senate Hearings, supra note 280, at 75–76 (statement of Rep. Edward E. Denison))); S. REP. NO. 731005, at 3 (explaining that a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment action allows a litigant to avoid “social and
economic waste and destruction in order to obtain a determination of one’s rights”).
282
Senate Hearings, supra note 280, at 35 (statement of E. R. Sutherland).
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hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you turn on the light and then take the
step.”283
Absent a stay, a declaratory judgment is immediately effective upon
issuance, regardless of whether appeals are pending.284 A person may exercise
their rights as set forth in the declaration, including taking actions for which they
would otherwise face the risk of punitive enforcement measures.285 If a person
may be retroactively prosecuted or subject to other punitive measures for steps
they took while a declaratory judgment was in effect, then the judgment would
be unable to achieve its purpose of declaring a person’s rights for that period.
The district court’s ruling would be akin to a mere advisory opinion, insufficient
on its own to provide definitive guidance about the legality of a plaintiff’s
intended activities unless and until all appeals were exhausted. And even then,
the judgment could be attacked under Rule 60(b) if subsequent developments in
precedent demonstrated that the judgment’s legal predicate was erroneous.286
This reasoning applies with equal force to permanent injunctions. A court’s
ability to exercise the judicial power would be crippled if the court could not
allow litigants to rely upon a permanent injunction that has entered into force.287
If the judgment or injunction turns out to be erroneous, then the consequence
should not be that the plaintiff’s conduct becomes retroactively illegal. Rather,
at most, the plaintiff should be subject to potential liability for compensatory
damages up to the amount of the injunction bond, if any, or restitution to prevent
unjust enrichment.288
Of course, the Constitution does not mandate that a ruling from a single
district judge must take immediate effect. Throughout much of the twentieth
283

69 CONG. REC. 2030 (1928) (statement of Rep. Ralph W.E. Gilbert).
See Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 539 (2015) (“Unless a court issues a stay, a trial court’s
judgment . . . normally takes effect despite a pending appeal. And a judgment’s preclusive effect is generally
immediate, notwithstanding any appeal.” (citation omitted)); 16A CHARLES E. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – JURISDICTION & RELATED MATTERS § 3954 (5th ed. 2021) (“The taking of an appeal
does not by itself suspend the operation or execution of a district-court judgment or order during the pendency
of the appeal.”); see, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1316 (N.D. Fla.
2011) (“[T]o suggest that a declaratory judgment will only be effective and binding on the parties after the
appeals process has fully run its course is manifestly incorrect and inconsistent with well established statutory
and case law.”); cf. Badger Cath., Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] declaratory judgment
is a real judgment, not just a bit of friendly advice . . . .”).
285
Cf. Florida, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1316–17 (stating that the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
could not implement the Affordable Care Act, including the individual mandate, while the district court’s
declaratory judgment holding it unconstitutional was in effect, but staying the declaratory judgment).
286
See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
287
See supra notes 271, 274 and accompanying text.
288
See supra notes 178, 244 and accompanying text.
284
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century, for example, Congress required most constitutional litigation to be
heard by district court panels comprised of three judges.289 One could conceive
of a judicial structure in which district courts’ injunctions or judgments were
automatically stayed, and therefore did not take effect, unless and until approved
by a court of appeals. Once an order or judgment does take effect, however, it
should settle the legality of actions the plaintiff performs throughout the time it
remains effective.
Likewise, Congress may prohibit federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
over certain types of cases290 or limit their jurisdiction to grant particular
remedies such as declaratory judgments or injunctions.291 But, again, once
Congress grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear a case and grant certain forms
of relief, such authority should be understood as including the power to protect
a litigant who acts in accordance with the court’s judgment from retroactive
punishment. Indeed, an order that was insufficient to establish the legality of
conduct that occurred while it remained in effect may lack the requisite
dispositiveness and finality to qualify as a constitutionally valid exercise of the
Article III judicial power. Rather than purporting to settle the litigants’ rights,
such an order would leave the ultimate legality of the plaintiff’s conduct to be
conclusively resolved, if at all, at some later time: on appeal, in a Rule 60(b)

289
See Michael T. Morley, Vertical Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 699,
701 (2020) (“Throughout much of the twentieth century, when a plaintiff asked a federal trial court to enjoin an
allegedly unconstitutional federal or state law, the case was heard by a panel of three judges, rather than by a
single judge.” (footnote omitted)).
290
Amar, supra note 31, at 670 (rejecting the notion that the federal judiciary has inherent authority to
“facilitate access to the federal courts for federal claimants,” due to the “commonly accepted wisdom that
Congress need not vest federal courts with anything close to the full extent of what Article III allows”); see
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation
jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. . . . No [court] can assert a just claim to jurisdiction
exclusively conferred on another, or withheld from all.”); see also Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8,
11 (1799) (“A Circuit Court, however, is of limited jurisdiction; and has cognizance, not of cases generally, but
only of a few specially circumstanced, amounting to a small proportion of the cases, which an unlimited
jurisdiction would embrace.”).
291
Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (upholding Congress’s authority to specify the
conditions under which a federal court may exercise jurisdiction to grant certain remedies); see, e.g., Tax
Injunction Act, ch. 726, 50 Stat. 738 (1937) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018)); Johnson Act, ch. 283, 48
Stat. 775 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018)); Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101–15 (2018)).
For a time, the Supreme Court had held that Article III did not permit federal courts to grant declaratory
judgments. See Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928) (holding that granting a declaratory
judgment “is beyond the power conferred upon the federal judiciary”); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273
U.S. 70, 76 (1927) (“[T]he District Court, as a court of the United States established under Article III of the
Constitution, had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the declaratory judgment.”). But see Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 244 (1937) (holding that the Article III judicial power extends to claims under
the Declaratory Judgment Act).
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collateral attack on the judgment, or with uncertainty lingering indefinitely. One
need not go so far, however, to conclude that, at a minimum, the Article III
judicial power presumptively allows federal courts to treat judgments that
incorporate permanent injunctions as dispositively establishing litigants’ rights
and liabilities concerning actions taken while those judgments are—or were—
in force.
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Edgar v. MITE Corp.292 and Professor
Mitchell’s writ of erasure argument,293 in contrast, would allow an injunction to
determine a plaintiff’s rights only so long as it remained in effect, leaving room
for the retroactive imposition of punitive consequences. Such an approach would
undermine the ability of federal courts to dispositively adjudicate litigants’
rights. Mitchell acknowledges that, under the writ of erasure approach,
“[j]udicial pronouncements of unconstitutionality” are inherently “temporary”
because “they are always subject to reversal on appeal or repudiation by a future
Supreme Court.”294 A court’s decision to enjoin enforcement of a law on
constitutional grounds is as transient, he argues, as a President’s decision to
refrain from enforcing a federal statute on constitutional grounds.295 He
elaborates, “[A]nyone who violates the statute during the injunction will run the
risk that a future court might vacate the injunction and allow the government to
pursue penalties against those who had previously violated the law.”296
Mitchell offers the example of Citizens United v. FEC.297 Under 52 U.S.C.
§ 30118, corporations cannot make expenditures for political communications
to influence federal elections.298 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that
Section 30118 is facially unconstitutional because corporations have a
fundamental First Amendment right to engage in pure political expression, even
if it costs money.299 Mitchell contends that politicians who oppose Citizens
United may nevertheless “threaten to prosecute anyone who violates [Section]
30118 if a future Supreme Court removes the judicial obstacles to enforcement”

292

457 U.S. 624, 647 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 941–42.
294
Id. at 941.
295
Id. at 941–42 (“[T]he court’s instruction to the executive lasts only as long as the judiciary adheres to
its belief that the statute violates the Constitution—just as a President’s non-enforcement order lasts only as long
as the President decides to keep that non-enforcement policy in effect.”).
296
Id. at 988.
297
Id. at 990–92 (discussing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
298
52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2018).
299
558 U.S. at 361, 365 (“[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity.”).
293
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within the statute of limitations period.300 Even though individuals currently
cannot be prosecuted for failure to comply with Section 30118, “the mere threat
of future prosecution . . . may be enough to induce substantial if not total
compliance with the statute during a period of judicial non-enforcement.”301
He similarly points to Shelby County v. Holder, in which the Supreme Court
effectively suspended the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirements by
invalidating the statutory formula for identifying covered jurisdictions subject
to them.302 Mitchell argues, “[C]overed jurisdictions should continue submitting
their voting-related laws to the Department of Justice for preclearance—even
after Shelby County—because the preclearance regime continues to exist as a
statutory requirement and it could be enforced if the Supreme Court returns to
Democratic control.”303
These examples confirm the narrow view of judicial authority embodied in
Justice Stevens’s and Professor Mitchell’s approach. If an injunction cannot
definitively legitimate conduct while it remains in effect, then both private
parties and government officials are forced into parallel legal worlds
simultaneously: one based on the law as it currently exists based on the district
court’s order, and another based on an alternate possible set of standards that a
court may retroactively apply at some point in the future should the injunction
be overturned. Rightsholders will often be deterred from exercising what courts
have declared to be their rights if they face the possibility of retroactive
prosecution should the underlying order or judgment be overturned. The greater
the controversy or legal uncertainty, the more a prudent or risk-averse person
will follow restrictions that are not being enforced; submit filings to government
offices that cannot be processed; attempt to follow procedures that are no longer
being implemented; and otherwise take wasteful, defensive measures to hedge
against the possibility that an appeal or subsequent change in precedent will not
only modify the law going forward, but also create substantial new retroactive
exposure. The regime embodied in these examples is not one in which a court’s
judgment—including that of the Supreme Court—dispositively adjudicates
rights, resolves disputes, or provides meaningful guidance for the future. Such a
torpid vision of the judicial power is not recognizable, desirable, or necessary.

300
301
302
303

Mitchell, supra note 26, at 992.
Id.
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
Mitchell, supra note 26, at 950.
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B. The Federal Equity Power
While the preceding section focused on the effects of permanent injunctions,
the federal judiciary’s constitutionally authorized equity powers304 also allow
federal courts to preclude the retroactive imposition of punitive measures for
conduct taken pursuant to either preliminary or permanent injunctions. The core
purpose of both types of orders is the prevention of irreparable injury to
rightsholders.305 The Supreme Court has frequently held that constitutional
violations, particularly First Amendment violations, constitute per se irreparable
injuries.306 One reason such violations are considered irreparable is due to the
obstacles aggrieved rightsholders face in seeking monetary compensation. For
example, federal and state entities have sovereign immunity from damages
claims for constitutional violations, particularly where such violations do not
amount to torts that fall within the scope of statutory waivers.307 And qualified
immunity often precludes litigants from recovering against individual
government officers.308
Even when immunity does not bar litigants from seeking compensatory
damages, they will often not receive adequate compensation. It may be difficult
to establish the amount of harm a rightsholder suffered, or the value of the
underlying right may be largely nonpecuniary, greatly limiting the amount of
damages that are potentially recoverable.309 Moreover, to the extent
constitutional restrictions are intended to prevent the government from
infringing on certain entitlements, monetary damages are a substitutionary

304
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under [federal law] . . . .”).
305
See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (establishing irreparable injury as a
requirement for preliminary injunctions); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding
the same for permanent injunctions).
306
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms,
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); see also Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 167 (1908) (holding that enforcement of unconstitutional laws “interfering with tangible property”
would cause “great and irreparable injury of the complainants”).
307
See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (holding that the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), does not waive the United States’ sovereign immunity against damages claims for
constitutional violations); Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. Coll. of S.C., 221 U.S. 636, 642 (1911) (“[E]very state
has absolute immunity from suit. Without its consent it cannot be sued in any court, by any person, for any cause
of action whatever.”).
308
See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual
Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 80 (1999) (“[Q]ualified immunity has proved to be a virtually
insurmountable hurdle to Bivens actions.”).
309
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978) (permitting plaintiffs who suffered constitutional
violations but were unable to establish that those violations caused them “actual injury” to recover only nominal
damages).
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remedy of a categorically different nature that do not protect the particular
entitlements at issue.310
The Court has also held that a person suffers irreparable harm when the
threat of sanctions or other adverse consequences chills or deters them from
exercising their constitutional rights.311 Ex Parte Young authorized federal
courts to award pre-enforcement injunctive relief against state laws that were
likely unconstitutional specifically to prevent that chilling effect.312 By lifting
the threat of enforcement, an injunction alleviates irreparable injury to the
putative rightsholder.313
For an injunction to serve this essential purpose of preventing irreparable
injury, it is not enough to simply prevent the government from imposing punitive
consequences against an actor while the order remains in effect. An actor who
knows they can be prosecuted or otherwise subject to punitive sanctions if an
injunction is overturned on appeal or dissolved is likely to be deterred from
exercising their claimed rights.314 Although the threat of immediate enforcement
has been held at bay, the reasonable possibility of punishment has not been
eliminated; prudent people will often continue to be chilled. A federal court’s
equitable authority allows it to do “complete rather than truncated justice.”315 To
achieve its goal of preventing irreparable harm to a plaintiff’s rights, a court
must have authority to bar enforcement of a legal provision for actions the
plaintiff performs while an injunction is in effect, even if that injunction is later
reversed or vacated.316

310

Morley, supra note 4, at 2469.
See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814–15 (1974) (holding that the plaintiffs had shown irreparable
injury because “[t]he workers, and their leaders and organizers were placed in fear of exercising their
constitutionally protected rights of free expression, assembly, and association”); see also Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 486, 489 (1965) (holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged irreparable injury due to the
“substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression” caused by the state’s threats to prosecute them for
engaging in civil rights advocacy).
312
209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908) (holding that state officers who threaten to enforce an unconstitutional
law “may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action”); see also Wadley S. Ry. Co. v. Georgia,
235 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1915) (explaining that a person should not be coerced to “yield to void orders, rather than
risk the enormous cumulative or confiscatory punishment that might be imposed if [the challenged provisions]
should thereafter be declared to be valid”).
313
See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (affirming a preliminary injunction that
prohibited enforcement of a local ordinance against the plaintiffs on First Amendment grounds because, “unless
preliminary relief is available upon a proper showing, plaintiffs in some situations may suffer unnecessary and
substantial irreparable harm”); see also Laycock, supra note 27, at 204 (“The preliminary injunction is one of
the classic remedies where temporary deprivations impose hardship.”).
314
See Gillen, supra note 29, at 300.
315
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
316
See Gillen, supra note 29, at 303–04.
311
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This point should not be overstated, however. One commentator contends,
for example, that “there is good reason to believe that the power of the federal
courts to provide preliminary injunctive relief derives directly from Article III
because it is essential for the federal judiciary to exercise the judicial power in a
meaningful way.”317 As discussed earlier, however, it is unlikely that Congress
must grant federal courts jurisdiction over all constitutional litigation in the first
place.318 Nor does the Constitution require Congress to grant federal courts
jurisdiction to issue equitable remedies in all cases in which they may be helpful
or appropriate.319 Thus, it is unlikely that a court could assert inalienable Article
III authority to enjoin enforcement of unconstitutional laws.320 Rather, when
Congress authorizes federal courts to exercise their broad equitable powers by
awarding remedies such as injunctions, we should presume that the effect of
such remedies is to fully achieve their traditional goal of preventing irreparable
harm.321
We have already seen that a reversed, vacated, or dissolved injunction can
prevent an erroneously enjoined defendant from suing for common law or
statutory harms that the plaintiff caused while the injunction was in effect. Such
a wrongfully enjoined party is instead relegated to seeking recovery against the
injunction bond, if any, or restitution.322 Likewise, when an enjoined party
violates an injunction while it was in effect, the government may prosecute that
party for criminal contempt, even if a court has since concluded that the
injunction was erroneous and reversed, vacated, or dissolved it.323 To fully
protect against chilling the exercise of constitutional rights, courts should
similarly recognize that reversed, vacated, and dissolved injunctions protect
plaintiffs from being subject to enforcement proceedings with a punitive
component for actions they took while the challenged legal provision was
enjoined. Even after an order is no longer in force, a federal court’s equitable
power to prevent irreparable harm allows that order to continue exerting a
residual effect concerning a plaintiff’s past actions.
317

Id. at 310.
See supra notes 290–91.
319
See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
320
See Amar, supra note 31, at 670 (rejecting the notion that federal courts have inherent authority “to
facilitate access . . . for federal claimants” due to “the commonly accepted wisdom that Congress need not vest
federal courts with anything close to the full extent of what Article III allows”).
321
Remedies for violations of the U.S. Constitution are a matter of constitutional common law. See
Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221 (2018). Courts are free to
presumptively apply traditional equitable principles, but Congress has discretion to displace them, at least within
broad limits. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1736.
322
See supra Part II.B.
323
See supra Part III.
318
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C. Methods of Implementation
Having explained why injunctions may continue to protect plaintiffs from
proceedings with a punitive component even after being reversed, vacated, or
dissolved, this section turns to the logistical question of how courts may
implement such protection. As discussed above, the Article III judicial power
and federal courts’ equitable authority are likely sufficient on their own to allow
federal courts to prevent governmental defendants from pursuing retroactive
enforcement actions for conduct that plaintiffs performed pursuant to erroneous,
subsequently overturned injunctions. The better approach, however, would be
for a court to expressly impose such restrictions in either the substantive
injunctions it issues or accompanying collateral injunctions. Alternatively, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could be amended to clarify the continuing
legal consequences of reversed injunctions.
1. Implied Injunctions
The Supreme Court has held that, under certain narrow circumstances,
federal courts may hold a litigant in contempt for performing otherwise legal
actions that frustrate the potential efficacy of future orders the court may
enter.324 In other words, a party may be held in contempt, even where the court
has not yet issued any injunction, for undermining a potential future order that
does not—and may never—exist. For example, in Merrimack River Savings
Bank v. Clay Center, the plaintiff was a bank that had loaned money to a local
power company; the loan was secured by the power company’s poles and wires
in a certain municipality.325 The municipality ended the power company’s
franchise and threatened to remove its poles and wires.326 The bank sued the
municipality, claiming that the municipality lacked authority to terminate the
power company’s franchise.327 The bank won a temporary injunction from the
trial court “to prevent the destruction of the lines of poles and wires as
threatened.”328 The bank then lost, both at the trial court and on direct appeal to
the Supreme Court.329
Before the time for petitioning the Supreme Court for rehearing had elapsed,
the municipality cut down and removed the power company’s poles and wires.330
324
325
326
327
328
329
330

Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. City of Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527, 536 (1911).
Id. at 532.
Id. at 532–33.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id.
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The bank filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to hold the municipality in
contempt.331 The municipality pointed out that the Court had not entered any
injunctions or orders that it could be accused of violating.332 The Court declined
to decide whether the municipality had violated the trial court’s temporary
injunction.333 It held instead that “irrespective of any such injunction actually
issued[,] the willful removal beyond the reach of the court of the subject-matter
of the litigation or its destruction pending an appeal . . . is, in and of itself, a
contempt of the appellate jurisdiction of this court.”334 The Court went on to
hold that the municipality had committed a “technical contempt” by destroying
the poles and wires.335 It concluded, however, that the municipality had acted in
good faith and its contempt was inadvertent since it had not anticipated the
possibility that the bank would petition for rehearing.336 The Court therefore
declined to impose contempt sanctions.337
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit went on to apply this
approach in Griffin v. County School Board.338 Several years after Brown v.
Board of Education held racially segregated schools unconstitutional,339 a
federal district court entered an injunction prohibiting Prince Edward County,
Virginia, from paying tuition grants to subsidize private schooling for white
children until the county’s public schools were desegregated and reopened.340 In
a later ruling, the district court ordered the county to appropriate the funds
necessary to reopen the public schools on a desegregated basis.341
The plaintiffs had also asked the district court to continue prohibiting the
county from funding tuition grants in upcoming academic years for the private
education of white students.342 They wanted the county to use those funds to
supplement the public school’s funding instead.343 The district court denied

331

Id.
Id. at 534.
333
Id. at 535.
334
Id. at 535–36 (emphasis added).
335
Id. at 536.
336
Id. at 536–37.
337
Id.; see also Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1932) (holding that, where the defendant in a
land dispute transferred part of the property at issue to his attorney as payment for attorneys’ fees, the attorney
could be held in contempt, even though the court had not entered any orders restricting transfers of the land).
338
363 F.2d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 1966).
339
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
340
Griffin, 363 F.2d at 208.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id.
332
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those aspects of the plaintiffs’ request, and they appealed.344 The Chief Judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit directed the court clerk to ask
the county to stipulate that it would voluntarily refrain from issuing tuition grants
while the appeal was pending, but the county refused.345 In the meantime, the
county rushed to process 1,217 grant applications and distributed about
$180,000 within a day of the court’s request.346
The plaintiffs moved to hold the county in contempt, even though it had not
violated any court order and had expressly declined the court’s request.347 The
Fourth Circuit held the members of the county board of supervisors in
contempt.348 It explained that, while the appeal was pending, the funds for tuition
grants were “wholly subject to [the Fourth Circuit’s] orders.”349 By making
grants to white parents, the board had placed the funds “beyond its control as
well as that of the court.”350 The board’s actions, the court ruled, were “an
arrogation of this court’s responsibility” because their “aim was to thwart the
impact of any adverse decree which might ultimately be forthcoming on the
appeal.”351 Thus, the Fourth Circuit effectively held the board members in
contempt for violating an injunction that the district court had refused to enter
and that the appellate court had not entered.352
In Merrimack and Griffin, the courts claimed inherent authority, even in the
absence of a written order, to punish contempts for acts that interfere with the
property at issue in a case and reduce or eliminate the value of potential future
orders that a court might later enter concerning that property. A court may
likewise claim authority to prohibit prosecutions or other enforcement actions
with a punitive component based on violations of a legal provision that occur
while that provision is enjoined, even absent a written order to that effect. Such

344

Id.
Id.
346
Id. at 208, 210.
347
Id. at 208–09.
348
Id. at 212.
349
Id. at 210.
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
See Federal Courts: Contempt: Payment of Tuition Grants by County Board of Supervisors to Parents
of White Children Attending Segregated Private Schools While Question of Board’s Power to Make Such Grants
is Pending on Appeal Constitutes Civil Contempt of Appellate Court, 52 VA. L. REV. 1556, 1569 (1966) (“It is
difficult to imagine a course of conduct more contemptuous of or disrespectful toward . . . the judicial process
and the entire federal system as well, than the feverish activity of the County Board of Supervisors of Prince
Edward County between midnight and dawn of August 5, 1964.”); see also Ronald K. Ingoe, Civil Contempt in
Federal Courts, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 122–23, 125 (1967) (discussing circumstances in which courts
may hold people in contempt despite the absence of an injunction).
345
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retroactive prosecutions following an injunction’s dissolution substantially
reduce the overall value and practical effects of a court’s injunctions in public
law cases. The possibility of such prosecutions allows enjoined legal provisions
to continue exerting a chilling effect, immune to judicial reduction, on plaintiffs’
exercise of their claimed rights. Moreover, rightsholders may be deterred from
attempting to seek judicial relief since, even if a court issues an injunction, the
rightsholders would remain subject to prosecution if the order is reversed on
appeal or otherwise dissolved. Thus, to preserve the efficacy of its orders,
particularly in constitutional litigation, a court might assert inherent authority to
bar the government from retroactively pursuing punitive enforcement measures
against a temporarily successful plaintiff, even without an explicit order setting
forth such permanent restrictions.
The “constitutional tolling” doctrine that some courts continue to apply is
based on similar reasoning. This doctrine provides that plaintiffs “ought not to
have to pay a statutory penalty for non-compliance with” a legal provision
“during the time they were judicially testing [its] validity,” even when a court
has not enjoined the provision’s enforcement.353 This doctrine rests primarily on
the Supreme Court’s rulings in Ex parte Young354 and Wadley Southern Railway
Co. v. Georgia,355 which held that the government could not rely on the threat
of substantial fines to deter people from seeking judicial review of legal
provisions. These cases recognize that rightsholders should not be pressured into
following a legal provision they believe is unconstitutional simply because they
do not want to run the risk of substantial penalties by violating it.356 This
353
United States v. Pac. Coast Eur. Conf., 451 F.2d 712, 717–18 (9th Cir. 1971); see, e.g., Kloosterboer
Int’l Forwarding LLC v. United States, No. 3:21-CV-198, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195312, at *15 (D. Alaska
Oct. 10, 2021) (“[T]he Court finds that constitutional tolling applies to preclude the imposition of additional
penalties . . . until entry of final judgment by this Court.”); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp.
705, 708 (D. Minn. 1976) (“Because [the defendant] mounted substantial, continuous legal challenges to [the
legal provision it violated], the law does not authorize imposition of penalties . . . .”).
354
209 U.S. 123, 146–48 (1908) (“[T]he provisions of the acts relating to the enforcement of the rates . . .
by imposing such enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a result of an unsuccessful effort to test the
validity of the laws themselves, are unconstitutional on their face, without regard to the question of the
insufficiency of those rates.”).
355
235 U.S. 651, 662 (1915) (“Liability to a penalty for violation of such orders, before their validity has
been determined, would put the party affected in a position where he himself must at his own risk pass upon the
question.”).
356
See, e.g., S.W. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490–91 (1915) (holding that, because “[t]here
was no mode of judicially testing the . . . reasonableness [of the phone company’s actions] in advance of acting,”
imposing “upon the company penalties aggregating $6,300 was so plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to be
nothing short of a taking of its property without due process of law”); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S.
340, 350 (1913) (holding that the plaintiff railroad could not be held liable for the substantial statutory fines that
accrued while it was litigating its constitutional defense against private lawsuits brought to enforce a statutory
rate schedule).
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principle may be sufficiently broad to protect a rightsholder who actually obtains
injunctive relief against a legal provision when that order is subsequently
reversed.
On their own terms, however, these lines of precedent are open to the
objection that they treat the absence of an injunction as equivalent to the issuance
of one. Enforcing such “implied injunctions” also seems to undermine the
efficacy of a court’s declinations to grant injunctions. Moreover, this approach
may generate unnecessary uncertainty about people’s legal rights. Without a
written order,357 a litigant must speculate about what conduct, if any, is
prohibited.
2. Collateral Injunctions
Rather than relying on implicit restrictions, a superior alternative would be
for federal courts to issue collateral injunctions alongside their preliminary and
permanent injunctions. A collateral injunction would bar the governmental
defendant from ever prosecuting a plaintiff for actions taken pursuant to the
accompanying substantive injunction. And it would remain in effect regardless
of what happens to that other order. The Supreme Court itself applied this
approach in a few cases from the early twentieth century.
For example, in Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, the plaintiff had
unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court to enjoin
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission from enforcing against it price controls
for laundry service.358 Jurisdictional statutes at the time allowed the plaintiff to
appeal that denial directly to the Supreme Court.359 The plaintiff argued that the
law was likely unconstitutional since it provided no opportunity for judicial
review of the mandated rates until a regulated entity violated them.360
The Court agreed with the plaintiff’s due process argument and issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Commission from enforcing the
challenged rates against the plaintiff for the duration of the litigation.361 The
Court explained that if the plaintiff proved that the rates were confiscatory, then

357
Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(B)–(C) (requiring that an injunction “state its terms specifically” and
“describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required”); see also Hessick & Morley, supra note
6, at 1070–71 (explaining the requirement for specificity in injunctions).
358
252 U.S. 331, 332–33 (1920).
359
See Morley, supra note 289, at 714–15 (discussing direct appeals from federal district courts to the
Supreme Court under the Evarts Act of 1891).
360
Love, 252 U.S. at 333.
361
Id. at 335, 337.
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“a permanent injunction should issue to restrain their enforcement.”362
Conversely, even if the rates were constitutionally permissible, “a permanent
injunction should, nevertheless, issue to restrain enforcement of penalties
accrued pendente lite,” so long as “the plaintiff had reasonable ground to contest
[the rates] as being confiscatory.”363 In other words, this order not only enjoined
enforcement of the challenged law pending a final judgment on the merits, but
also specified that the law could not be retroactively enforced against the
plaintiff for acts it took while that injunction was in effect—even if the plaintiff
ultimately lost on the merits of its challenge and the law was valid.
Similarly, in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Clyne, the plaintiffs were
members of the Chicago Board of Trade who challenged the constitutionality of
the federal Grain Futures Act.364 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’
bill.365 They took a direct appeal as of right to the Supreme Court.366 With the
Government’s consent, the Court granted an injunction pending appeal against
enforcement of the law.367 The injunction mandated that “the status quo be
preserved while th[e] cause [was] pending in th[e] Court and for twenty days
thereafter.”368 To accomplish that goal, the order prohibited the U.S. Attorney
for the Northern District of Illinois from “attempting to enforce the . . . ‘Grain
Futures Act’ during the pendency of this cause in this court and for twenty days
thereafter.”369 The order went further, however, stating the following:
[The U.S. Attorney is prohibited] from at any time prosecuting
criminally, or otherwise, under said act any member of the Board of
Trade of the city of Chicago, or any customer of any such member,
for, or by reason of, any violation by him or them of any provision of
said act committed during the pendency of this cause in this court or
twenty days thereafter.370

Thus, like a traditional preliminary injunction, the order prevented the
Government, while the constitutional challenge remained pending, from
prosecuting Chicago Board of Trade members and their customers for violating

362

Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 338.
364
260 U.S. 704, 704 (1922) (per curiam); see also Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 40 (1923)
(affirming, in a later ruling, the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional challenge to the Grain Futures
Act).
365
Olsen, 262 U.S. at 3.
366
Id.
367
Clyne, 260 U.S. at 704.
368
Id.
369
Id.
370
Id. (emphasis added).
363
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the Grain Futures Act. The order further barred the Government, however, from
ever prosecuting them for actions they took in violation of the Act while the
Court was adjudicating their appeal.371 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected
the plaintiffs’ challenge, and there is no record of the Government subsequently
prosecuting any board members or their customers for violating the act during
the appeal.372 Some lower courts have also periodically applied this approach,
both in the early twentieth century373 and in the modern era.374
As a matter of practice, courts should either include such language in their
injunctions or issue collateral orders imposing such restrictions. Should an
injunction that bars enforcement of a legal provision get reversed, vacated, or
dissolved on the merits, such subsequent developments should not eliminate the
plaintiff’s supplemental protections, whether they appear in the same order or a
collateral order. That is, ancillary provisions in a court order enjoining a
government defendant from retroactively bringing enforcement actions for
violations of an enjoined legal provision that occur while the injunction’s main
substantive restrictions are in effect should survive any later reversal of those
substantive restrictions.
3. Interpreting Injunctions
Rather than leaving it to each court to include language in each injunction
prohibiting retroactive prosecutions and other punitive measures, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65 may be amended to address the issue. Rule 65(d)(2)

371

Id. at 704–05.
Olsen, 262 U.S. at 43 (affirming the district court).
373
See, e.g., Otoe Cnty. Nat’l Bank v. Delany, 88 F.2d 238, 243 (8th Cir. 1937) (“Even though the chief
equitable relief sought be denied, the court has power to grant other relief of an equitable nature . . . , such as
relief from penalties pendente lite, if there was reasonable ground for plaintiff originally seeking equitable relief
. . . .”); Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 35 F.2d 675, 676 (6th Cir. 1929) (holding the same); United Fuel Gas Co.
v. R.R. Comm’n of Ky., 13 F.2d 510, 517 (E.D. Ky. 1925) (holding that, in a challenge to the constitutionality
of maximum rates for natural gas, if the rates are “found to be not confiscatory, a permanent injunction should
nevertheless issue to restrain the enforcement of penalties accrued pendente lite”).
374
See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18546, at *16–17 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20,
1998) (entering temporary restraining order barring the government “from enforcing or prosecuting matters
premised upon 47 U.S.C. § 231 of the Child Online Protection Act at any time for any conduct that occurs while
th[e] Order is in effect” (footnote omitted)), preliminary injunction entered, ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,
498–99 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (containing identical language barring prosecutions for conduct occurring while the
order is in effect), aff’d, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002);
Int’l Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 672 F. Supp. 29, 35 (D. Me. 1987) (entering preliminary injunction and discussing
the plaintiff’s right, “even for unsuccessful challenges, to have penalties enjoined pendente lite where plaintiffs
had reasonable grounds to raise them”); see also Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 315–16 (2d Cir.
1986) (“One way of ensuring that a plaintiff is not faced with such unconstitutional penalties is to require that
no penalty be imposed where a challenge was brought in good faith.”).
372
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governs the “Contents and Scope of Every Injunction and Restraining Order.”375
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee could propose the following addition to
it:
(d)(3) Applicability of Injunction. Any order that affects, restricts,
limits, prohibits, or otherwise enjoins enforcement of any legal
provision—whether permanently or pending trial or appeal—shall be
presumptively interpreted as permanently affecting, restricting,
limiting, prohibiting, or otherwise enjoining enforcement of that legal
provision for actions taken while the order remains or remained in
effect, unless the order expressly specifies otherwise.
Such implied restrictions shall presumptively remain in effect,
notwithstanding the reversal, withdrawal, modification, overturning,
vacation, or dissolution of such order, unless the court expressly
specifies otherwise.

An amendment to Rule 65 would help avoid unnecessary disputes by expressly
resolving the issue. Including this proviso in Rule 65 would also alleviate the
need to complicate every court order by including such language. Additionally,
this proposal would alleviate the possibility of problems arising when an
attorney inevitably fails to request such language.
A potential drawback to this approach is that questions may arise as to
whether this rule modifies substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling
Act (REA).376 The Court upholds rules as valid exercises of authority under the
REA so long as they are “arguably procedural,”377 which is a very low threshold
to surmount.378 The proposed Rule 65(d)(3) would merely provide a new rule
for interpreting injunctions rather than affect substantive rights. It seems similar
to existing Rule 65(d)(2), which provides another interpretive rule for
injunctions.379 That provision specifies that an injunction applies not only to
litigants and their agents, but also to third-party non-litigants who receive notice
of the order and are “in active concert” with an enjoined party.380 Rather than
creating new rights, the proposed Rule 65(d)(3) interpretive rule would

375

FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018) (prohibiting federal procedural rules from enlarging, abridging, or
modifying “any substantive right”).
377
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 472 (majority
opinion) (holding that a rule is valid under the REA so long as it is “rationally capable of classification as either”
procedural or substantive).
378
See Note, The Rules Enabling Act and the Limits of Rule 23, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2294, 2294 (1998)
(“[T]he Court has never applied the REA to invalidate a Federal Rule.”).
379
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
380
Id. 65(d)(2)(C); see Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, supra note 6, at 49–50 n.277.
376
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expressly specify restrictions already authorized by the Article III judicial power
and the federal judiciary’s equity power.381
CONCLUSION
Injunctions have been a crucial tool in constitutional litigation for well over
a century.382 Yet the Supreme Court remains uncertain about whether erroneous
injunctions that prohibit enforcement of challenged legal provisions but are later
overturned or vacated can nevertheless protect plaintiffs from retroactive
prosecution or other punitive enforcement proceedings for actions taken while
those orders were in effect.383 The Court’s interpretations of many of the most
seemingly relevant restrictions—due process notice requirements, protections
against ex post facto laws, the mistake of law defense—may be too narrow to
fully prevent such retroactive enforcement.384
Federal courts have authority, however, to prevent such retroactive
enforcement. The Article III judicial power includes the power to dispositively
adjudicate litigants’ rights. When a court enters a permanent injunction as part
of its final judgment that a legal provision is invalid, that exercise of the federal
judicial power should be understood as conclusively establishing the litigants’
rights, unless and until it is stayed or overturned. To have such a dispositive
effect, that judgment must be able to protect the plaintiff from prosecution or
other punitive consequences, even if the judgment is later overturned as
erroneous. The plaintiff may be liable on an injunction bond to provide
compensation to the wrongfully enjoined government defendant or in restitution
to prevent unjust enrichment from an erroneous court ruling. However, such a
plaintiff should not be subject to liability with a punitive aspect, including civil
fines, presumed statutory damages, professional discipline, or prosecution.
Likewise, the primary function of both preliminary and permanent
injunctions is to prevent irreparable injury.385 The Court has recognized that the
risk of prosecution or other remedies with a punitive component can chill the
exercise of constitutional and other rights, thereby inflicting irreparable injury.
381

See supra Parts IV.A–B.
See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908) (“[I]ndividuals who, as officers of the State,
. . . threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against
parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court
of equity from such action.”).
383
See supra notes 22–23 (summarizing the various opinions in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982)).
384
See supra Part I.C.
385
See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
382
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For a preliminary or permanent injunction to be capable of effectively alleviating
that chill and preventing the ensuing harm, it must offer permanent protection
against the risk of punitive consequences for violating the enjoined legal
provisions. That protection must apply even if the injunction is overturned,
vacated, or dissolved.
To the extent these restrictions arise from the Constitution, Congress is
unable to directly abrogate them (short of restricting the jurisdiction of the
federal courts386). Alternatively, the principles governing equitable relief in
constitutional cases may be constitutional default rules,387 which the
Constitution establishes as a matter of constitutional common law388 and are
subject to congressional retrenchment.389 Regardless, nothing in either the text
or legislative histories of the federal laws upon which federal courts draw to
adjudicate constitutional cases390 suggests that Congress intended to limit the
scope of this broad remedial authority.
Federal courts may implement this authority by expressly prohibiting the
government from pursuing enforcement actions with a punitive aspect for
violations of a legal provision that occur while that provision’s enforcement is
enjoined. Such language may be included in the same injunction that prohibits
enforcement of the challenged provision or an accompanying supplemental
order. Should a court later determine that the main injunction was erroneously
issued, it should reverse or vacate only the portions of the order that enjoin
prospective enforcement of the challenged statute or regulation, leaving

386

See supra notes 290–91 and accompanying text.
John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 825, 827 (2006) (arguing that “judicial decisions frequently create default rather than mandatory
rules, thereby providing opportunities for political actors to displace those rules”); see Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) (“The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and
federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, [but] [t]he power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful
executive action is subject to express and implied statutory limitations.” (citing Louis L. Jaffe & Edith G.
Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REV. 345 (1956))); cf. Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2095–96 (2002)
(discussing “constitutional starting-point rules,” which “the Court has no constitutional common lawmaking
power to alter, but that may be altered by act of Congress”).
388
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1975) (“[A]cceptance of
the Supreme Court’s power to fashion constitutional common law . . . is the most satisfactory way to rationalize
a large and steadily growing body of Court decisions.”).
389
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1736.
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See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018) (granting sweeping federal-question jurisdiction over cases arising
in both law and equity); id. § 2201 (granting authority to award declaratory judgments); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018)
(creating a cause of action to provide equitable relief against people acting under color of state law for
constitutional violations); see also supra notes 277–83 (discussing the legislative history of the Declaratory
Judgment Act).
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undisturbed the ancillary provisions barring retroactive enforcement.
Alternatively, the Court could amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to
establish these principles as default rules for interpreting injunctions.
Professor Mitchell’s “writ of erasure” argument, in contrast, would allow for
retroactive prosecution once an injunction is reversed.391 It is premised on the
notion that an overturned court order no longer exists and, therefore, may no
longer protect the plaintiff in any way.392 This claim, however logical sounding,
is inconsistent with the traditional equitable principles that govern injunctions.
For example, a wrongfully enjoined defendant cannot pursue common law
causes of action or statutory claims against a plaintiff for acts that the plaintiff
took under the protection of an erroneous, subsequently overturned injunction.
Rather, the defendant is relegated to either an action on the injunction bond or a
restitution claim. Likewise, a wrongfully enjoined defendant who violates an
injunction while it was in effect may be punished for criminal contempt, even
after the injunction has been deemed erroneous and overturned. In short, even a
subsequently reversed erroneous injunction continues to govern the litigants’
rights for the period it remained in effect. This principle should equally protect
a plaintiff who violates a legal provision that has been enjoined, even if that
order is later reversed. While injunctions do not completely erase invalid statutes
or regulations from the law books, such issuances may nevertheless permanently
protect plaintiffs, even after being reversed, vacated, or dissolved.

391

See Mitchell, supra note 26, at 987.
See id. at 943 (“[A] future court will always hold the prerogative to repudiate the constitutional
pronouncements of its predecessors and give retroactive effect to its new interpretation of the Constitution.”).
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